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ABSTRACT
The founding of the Federal Reserve System in the US in 1914 is viewed as a 
major structural transformation of the US economy. Scholars consider that the 1914 
structural change of the US economy greatly altered the stochastic processes generating 
short term interest rates. In the US case, most short-term interest rate time series analyses 
suggest that prior to 1914 short-term interest rate time series were stationary whereas 
sometime after 1914 they became non-stationary. In addition to this finding, some 
researchers found that the same phenomenon occurred simultaneously in more European 
countries.
This thesis challenges the theory of simultaneous world-wide occurrence of the 
altered behavior of short-term interest rates after 1914. It employs 2296 weekly 
observations of the British 60-day bankers’ drafts’ rate between 1890 and 1933. Using 
augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression techniques, the empirical results suggest that 
the founding of the Fed had no connection with the altered statistical behavior of British 
short-term interest rates.
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The Altered Behavior of Interest Rates in the UK after 
the Founding of the Federal Reserve System in the US in 1914
Introduction
The founding of the Federal Reserve System (Fed) in 1914 has had a crucial 
impact on the United States economy. Not only has the Fed improved the structural 
stability of the American economy, but it has also eliminated the large seasonality of 
interest rates that existed prior to the Fed’s creation. Among scholars and researchers, the 
improved structural stability generated by the Fed is still a matter of debate (Capie and 
Rodrik-Bali, 1985; Goodfriend, 1987; Capie and Goodhart, 1995). Prior to the works of 
Clark (1986), Miron, Mankiw, and Weil (1987, 1994), and Fishe and Wohar (1990), the 
elimination of the interest rate seasonality, and the Fed’s responsibility for the changed 
behavior of short-term interest rates in the United States, after 1914, were issues widely 
agreed upon.
It is quite difficult to clearly distinguish the factors responsible for the changed 
behavior of the short-term interest rate time series. Initially, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil 
(1987) believed that, after 1914, the Fed had very much to do with the alteration of the 
interest rate behavior. Angelini (1994), and Fishe and Wohar (1990) argued that many 
other events could have influenced time series behavior of the interest rate. Perhaps the 
Aldrich-Veerland Act of 1908, or the Money Committee of 1914-1917, or maybe the 
breakdown o f the gold standard in August 1914 could have been responsible.
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In any case, in a later paper, Mankiw et al. (1994) admitted that the founding of 
the Fed might not be the only factor responsible for the altered behavior of interest rates 
after 1914. “The observed change in the behavior o f short-term interest rates between the 
pre-1910 and post-1920 periods may have been significantly affected by other 
developments (m. n.: the Aldrich-Veerland Act, and the Money Committee of 1914- 
1917), quite apart from the foundation of the Fed.” (p. 551)
To complicate the issue even further, Clark (1986) showed that the same 
phenomenon occurred at the same time in many other countries of Europe. In England, 
France, and Germany, the short-term interest rate behavior changed after 1914. From 
stationary time series it became non-stationary. This fact implies either that the American 
events could have transmitted the altered behavior o f short-term interest rates to other 
countries, or that a common group of factors, or a single event, might have influenced all 
countries simultaneously. Previous works related to the pre-1914 short-term interest rate 
behavior (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Goodhart, 1969) argued that short-term interest 
rates “exhibited pronounced seasonal movements prior to the commencement of 
operations by the Fed in November 1914.” (Clark, 1986, p. 79) Clark (1986) showed that 
until the end of 1917 the Fed did not initiate the actions usually credited with the 
elimination of interest rate seasonals. Consequently, the Fed could not be responsible for 
the 1914 altered behavior of the short-term interest rates in the U.S. or abroad.
To test the 1914 break of the interest rate behavior, Barsky, Mankiw, Miron, and 
Weil (1988) developed a different theoretical model of interest rate, monetary policy, and 
inflation rates. They analyzed the interest rate pattern prior and after the 1971 breakdown
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of the Bretton Woods regime and compared it with pre-1914 and post-1914 periods. 
Their main conclusion was that the “gold standard did not play a crucial role in 
precipitating the changes in interest rate behavior.” (p. 1123)
Clark (1986) argued that the Fed actions had nothing to do with the changed 
behavior of short-term interest rate after 1914. Barsky et al. (1988), on the other hand, 
argued that the gold standard did not influence the pattern of the interest rate after 1914. 
Is there a main cause that determined the changed behavior of interest rate in the US and 
UK after 1914? The next parts of this thesis will present an extended historical overview 
of the 1890-1933 British banking system. We will identify both the historical explanations 
for outliers in data, and the intricate relationships that existed in the British economy pre- 
and post-1914.
The main goal of this thesis is the study of the effects of the founding of the 
Federal Reserve in 1914 on the behavior of British short-term interest rate. The period 
under analysis is 1890-1933. We hypothesize the next issue: Did the Bank of England 
adopt similar objectives to those of the Fed? If this is true, then when did it begin to have 
objectives similar to those of the Fed? In other words, when did the Bank of England start 
to behave as if it were smoothing interest rates? This paper employs 2296 weekly 
observations of the 60-day bankers’ drafts rate. Although this rate was not directly 
determined by the Bank of England, it closely followed the official bank rate. The next 
three chapters of the thesis will include an extended historical overview of the 1890-1933 
British banking system. Chapter 5 will present a brief historical overview of the Fed 
together with some theoretical considerations on the changed behavior of short-term
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interest rate after 1914. Chapter 6 will describe the data and its outliers. After that, in 
order to evaluate the main properties of the British 60-day draft rate time series, 
augumented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression techniques will be used. The main conclusion 
and a reference list will end this paper.
Chapter 1. The Bank of England From Its Origins to the First World War
1.1 The Bank of England between 1694 and the 1800s
The Bank of England, founded in 1694, is considered the oldest central bank of the 
world even though the Bank o f Sweden at Stockholm began “the first issue o f actual bank 
notes in Europe in 1661.” (Clapham, 1958, p. 3) This is due in part to the specific 
privileges that the government gave to the Bank of England. In 1694 England was at war, 
and the government needed money to finance its increased spending. The Bank of England 
was a private bank chartered by the Crown to lend money to the government in exchange 
for promissory notes and other privileges. At its beginning, the Bank would lend money 
only to the government in exchange for the latter’s promise to pay back both the principal 
and the interest. In this way the Bank’s profits were strictly dependent on the government 
demand for loans. As long as the Bank would receive the amount of money it had lent to 
the Exchequer plus the promised interest, there would be a strong stimuli for the Bank to 
attract as much money as possible to its deposit accounts. Using this process, by 1696, 
only two years after its charter began, the Bank would issue standardized notes 
guaranteed by the government. In addition, the Bank performed the basic activities a
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traditional bank of the time was supposed to do. These included discount operations, the 
use of write-off techniques to increase its deposit, the deposit itself, the issue of notes, 
and the use of checks for making payments.
It is worth mentioning that in 1696 the Bank of England issued two types of notes. 
One was its own, called running-cash notes (in large denominations), and the other one of 
the government, called the Exchequer Bills (in 10 and 5 pounds denominations).
(Clapham, 1958, pp. 37-38) Basically, the Bank issued a note when a person deposited 
gold with it, and a different type of note when the government borrowed money from it. 
Eventually, the Exchequer Bills were made acceptable in the payment o f taxes.
In 1697 the Bank privileges were reinforced by a new law. The law would give the 
Bank the ability to expand the standardization of its note issues, to increase the volume of 
discounts, and to begin its very important trade in precious metals. But perhaps the most 
important achievement of the Bank of England after the 1697 law would be the promotion 
of commerce and finance activities in London. As long as prior to 1697 the Bank had 
changed frequently the look and design of its note issues, standardization of the Bank note 
issues was important to both institutions and public.
Despite periods of uncertainty, caused by frequent wars across Europe, the activity 
of the Bank of England expanded considerably during the eighteenth century. The 
discount operations of the Bank began to be openly regulated by its directors. Mainly, the 
discount operations included any domestic drafts with a maturity no longer than 30 days, 
and any foreign bills with a maturity under 60 days. The rates of discount would be
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changed regularly depending on many factors, such as the South Sea crisis or the Seven 
Years’ War (1786-1783).
However, there were two official institutions that could trade precious metals: The 
Mint and the Bank. Basically, they had the same objectives but the Mint could not issue its 
own notes. Although the trade in precious metals was a statutory right of the Bank, there 
were no rules that would regulate the rivalry between the Mint and the Bank.
Nevertheless, the Bank would “buy gold and silver on the best terms it can for the service 
of its purposes.” (Ibid., p. 132) At the beginning of the eighteenth century the Bank 
would offer itself as the central warehouse for treasure, and occasionally, to store any 
imported gold or silver for which the bills of lading were deposited with it. Accordingly, 
the Bank developed the policy of making loans against gold or silver deposits.
Periodically, the charter of the Bank of England would be renewed. (The charters 
were to be renewed at 50 years spans, but in fact they were renewed earlier, in 1764, and 
1781.) At the same time, the new charters would further clarify the objectives of the Bank.
The nineteenth century would begin under adverse conditions for the Bank of 
England. Between 1797 and 1821 the Bank suspended its cash payments to other 
commercial banks because of the economic crises generated by the American and 
Napoleonic wars (1793-1815). The British national debt went up, general goods and gold 
prices also went up, so that it became more and more difficult for the government to 
finance the war efforts of the Crown. Once the cash payment resumed by the Bank in 1821 
the general price level started decreasing. It was not clear if the causality between the
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resumption of cash payment and the price deflation was very strong, since it could as well 
happen that the velocity of money or the credit substitutes use increased.
Between 1821 and 1825, Britain passed through a period of economic recovery 
and prosperity. Eventually the recovery turned into a boom with full employment, strong 
inflationary pressures, and speculation in both the capital market and commodity markets. 
(Collins, 1988, p. 17) This led at the end of 1825 to a severe internal liquidity crisis, which 
depleted the reserves of the banking system. The Bank of England only in the end averted 
the threat to convertibility to its own notes, by freely lending money to those who 
requested it. For this reason, the government took actions to prevent such reoccurrence in 
the future. The new law would challenge the Bank of England's privileged positions by 
allowing the formation of banks with an unrestricted number of partners outside a 65-mile 
radius from London, and by asserting the right of the new type of bank to participate in 
the discounting of bills in London or elsewhere, provided the bills were not drawn on the 
bank itself. However, the law itself could not do much to avoid the economic fluctuations 
whose consequences would, in the end, impose more responsibility for the Bank’s actions.
Since the main objective of this thesis is the study of change in the time series 
behavior of the interest rate after the creation of the Fed in 1914, and the data set used 
covers the 1890-1933 time frame, the next two sections of the paper will study in more 
details the economic and historical events between 1890 and 1933.
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1.2 From Bimetallism to Monometallism
Starting with 1694, when the Bank of England began its activity, and until its 
nationalization in 1946, when the government forcedly bought the Bank’s stocks, the 
Bank remained a privately-owned joint-stock bank. Thus, the Bank’s stockholders would 
expect a reasonable return on their capital. In no sense was the Bank a public agency or a 
department of state, but nevertheless at the end of the nineteenth century it had developed 
into a central bank. This does not imply that the Bank would control and regulate the 
monetary and banking matters on behalf of the government, as it does today. In 1697 the 
parliament denied charters to any other banks and in 1709 it limited the number of partners 
in all other banks to a maximum of six. In 1833 the Bank’s privileges culminated in the 
declaration, by parliament, of its notes as English legal tender. From then on, the Bank 
became the largest note issuer in the country -with a monopolistic power in London- and 
this fact led to the consolidation of its unique position in the British banking system.
Gradually, around the 1900s, the Bank accepted broad, public responsibilities for 
the maintenance of “healthy finance” by acting according to specific economic situations, 
to avoid threats to the value of the pound sterling. The Bank discouraged any speculative 
practices and would act as a lender of last resort even though it was not required by its 
statutes. The government did not interfere with the Bank’s activities and the Bank would 
be solely responsible for the monetary situation of the country.
In Europe, by the turn of the 20th century, the governments of most countries 
would promote “central banks” with the pre-determined role of “defending” the national 
currencies. France, in 1800, Italy, in 1878, and Germany, in 1876, had created central
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banks with very well specified roles. The Bank of England had existed before, but around 
the same period its actions began to resemble that of the continental central banks. The 
crystallization o f the Bank of England’s activities was an evolutionary process encouraged 
by a multitude of factors.
First, the Bank management of the day responded to legal constraints and 
obligations, and mostly to immediate economic pressures. Occasionally, the leaders of the 
bank might as well have been aware of their public responsibilities, but in the vast majority 
of the cases their actions were the consequences of a trial and error process. From a profit 
seeking institution, at its inception, to a central bank of the nineteenth century, the Bank of 
England covered a far from smooth itinerary. Secondly, the Bank lacked any viable 
competitors. The Crown never considered seriously the establishment of a public bank for 
the issue of notes or the conduct of other commercial banking business, and in fact it 
retained full responsibility for the coinage. Under such circumstances, the Bank came to be 
the largest and most influential British bank. The scale of its business would greatly 
influence any kind of transactions on the London money markets.
The importance of the Bank was also emphasized by its general relationship with 
the government. From its first loans to the government and to the moment when it was in 
charge of handling the government’s accounts, the Bank had an independent source of 
income, besides its commercial banking activities. Because the Bank was so big, it needed 
to hold huge reserves of coin and bullion against its notes and deposit liabilities. Thus, the 
government decided, after 1833, to keep the nation’s gold reserve in the Bank o f England 
vaults. Commercial banks have also gained from this new status of the Bank, so long as
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more and more of their cash holdings would consist of Bank notes and deposit balances at 
the Bank of England. In this way it was much easier to meet their inter-bank debts or 
convert notes quickly to coin. This attribute of the central bank notes would define the 
Bank of England as the bankers’ bank.
Moreover, in times of panic or liquidity pressure the Bank found itself in the 
position of the ultimate supplier of cash, as other commercial banks drew on their 
accounts or borrowed from the Bank in order to meet their own customers’ needs. The 
Bank acted to defend the public against unexpected losses and the result was an increased 
confidence in the banking system. However, the evolution of the Bank environment was 
from a very limited legal constraint based on the obligation to maintain the free 
convertibility o f its notes into coin, to a more elaborate legal frame work, often imposed 
by the Bank’s practices themselves.
The 19th century was a century of profound changes in Britain. Commercial 
banking became the backbone of British economic development. It is surprising to see 
how a private bank got excluded from sharing the newly created market for loans and 
services and became specialized in exclusive functional areas. The explanation given to 
this paradox was mainly of a legislative order. (Collins, 1988, p. 170) The Bank was the 
largest note-issuer and depository of England’s gold reserve and had the only obligation to 
maintain convertibility of sterling. Even so, from time to time, the financial system would 
be stricken by crises. In those situations, because of its gold reserves, the Bank stepped in 
and made advances to the rest of the banking system so as to avoid a general collapse.
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From February 1821 until the outbreak of the First World War, Britain was on a 
stable exchange rate in terms of gold. The Bank of England was assigned by law to 
preserve this convertibility. Still there was no rule on how was the Bank supposed to act 
in cases when there was a threat to the gold standard. Several major crises characterized 
by “acute oscillations in monetary variables” (Ibid., p. 172), called for strong regulation.
In 1825/26, 1837, 1839, 1847, 1857, 1866 the cost and availability of bank credit, gold 
flows, and the number of bankruptcies underwent sharp changes.
The act of 1833 was the first step in allowing the Bank to diversify its monetary 
tools. The act abolished the legal maximum of 5% per annum on the rate of interest 
charged on promissory notes and bills of exchange drawn at or under three-month 
duration. Before this “liberalization” of interest rates, the Bank would have to ration the 
loans when the demand for loan would increase, whereas, starting in 1833 cm, the Bank 
could practice punitive rates to slow down the demand for loans. The Bank’s intentional 
manipulation of the bank rate was to become an essential element of the 19th century 
Bank instrumental policy.
Although the gold standard -fully legally introduced in the United Kingdom in 
1844- was in a minority among trading nations, it proved to be a well-inspired decision. 
Since the US had a bimetallic standard based on both gold and silver, and Belgium, 
Holland, Spain, Switzerland, France, Italy, and the main German states were tied to silver 
in one form or another, the United Kingdom had a privileged position. It gave a very solid 
base for financial intermediation. During the last quarter o f the nineteenth century the 
actual price ratio o f gold to silver decreased compared to the official price. The
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speculative operations of financiers (based mostly in London) forced the vast majority of 
the central banks to officially change from (gold and silver) bimetallism to (gold) 
monometallism. After unification, Germany established a gold standard in 1873. In a short 
period all other European nations switched to gold. In 1879 the US, too, adopted gold 
convertibility.
1.3 The Golden Rule of the Gold Standard
As more and more countries joined the gold standard, exchange rates became 
more rigid. The international gold standard imposed a system of fixed exchange rates. It is 
argued that the main advantage of this system was greater price stability. Under normal 
situations, official obligations to exchange national currencies for a fixed quantity of gold, 
combined with the relative freedom to export goods and services, as well as bullion, specie 
and currency, would suffice to ensure stable exchange rates over a short term period 
between the participating countries.
In a completely free market, the rate of exchange between two currencies would . 
be determined by demand and supply. The demand for a foreign currency relative to 
domestic currency increases if, say, in the domestic country the demand for goods 
imported from the foreign country increases. In this instance traders would want to 
convert more foreign monetary units into domestic units, thus increasing the relative value 
o f the foreign units in terms of domestic units. At the same time, each currency had an 
official content in gold. Consequently, the implicit foreign exchange rate would be 
determined by the gold content ratio of the two currencies. Should the market forces
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change this implicit ratio, traders had always the option of converting the undervalued 
monetary unit into gold at the official rate and eventually buying back the overvalued 
currency at the official convertibility rate. The effect of this operation would actually 
consist of decreasing the demand for foreign currency and thus reestablishing the 
equilibrium. This implied a self- regulatory mechanism that greatly depended on the 
official guarantees of the authorities to pay a fixed amount of gold for national currencies.
Between 1877-1933 the British pound was valued at 113.0016 grains of fine gold, 
and the American dollar at 23.22 grains of fine gold (99.996 % purity). The implicit or 
official rate of exchange between the two currencies was 1 pound = $ 4.866. Holders of 
foreign currency would not accept anything less than the official rate as long as they could 
demand gold for their holdings and exchange it in domestic units at the official rate. The 
only deviation from the implicit exchange rate was due to the cost o f remitting gold 
overseas. Yet, shipping, handling, and insurance costs would slightly alter the official rate. 
Collins (1988, p. 132) estimated that, between 1877-1913, the actual exchange rate at 
which gold would be exported from Britain to the US was 1 pound = $ 4.857, while the 
gold would be imported in Britain from the US at 1 pound = $ 4.872.
1.3.1 External Balance Under the Gold Standard
Under the gold standard, the most important goal of the Bank of England was to 
preserve the official parity between sterling and gold. To do this the Bank needed (and 
had) an adequate stock of gold reserves. The government viewed external balance not in 
terms of current accounts but in terms of a situation in which the central bank was neither 
losing or gaining gold reserves. For instance, a deficit in the balance of payments had to be
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financed by a shipment o f gold abroad. In other words, the Bank of England tried to avoid
V *
large fluctuations in the balance of payments. Because international reserves took the form 
of gold, the surplus or deficit in the balance of payments had to be financed by gold 
shipments between central banks.
Starting with the American financial panic of 1907, some central banks (France, 
Germany, and Italy) began to hold foreign currency in their reserves. The pound sterling 
was the most trusted foreign currency. But most balance of payments was financed 
through gold shipments. To avoid large gold movements between countries, the Bank of 
England pushed the nonreserve component of the capital account surplus (or deficit) into 
line with the current account deficit (or surplus). In this way, the current account balance 
was financed entirely by international lending without gold (or foreign currency) 
movements.
1.3.2 The Price-Specie Flow Mechanism
The gold standard contained some powerful “automatic” adjustment mechanisms 
that contributed to the simultaneous achievement of balance of payments equilibrium by all 
countries. Assume that Britain’s current account surplus would be greater than its 
nonreserve capital account deficit. Since foreigners’ net imports from Britain were not 
financed entirely by British loans, the balance of payments had to be matched by flows of 
gold (or perhaps pound sterling) into Britain. The input of gold “automatically” reduced 
foreign currency supplies and increased pound money supply, reducing foreign prices, and 
increasing domestic (British) prices.
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Imports could be paid for by gold reserves or by selling pounds to the Bank of 
England for gold and then using the gold to buy imports. The simultaneous rise in British 
prices and fall in foreign prices reduced foreign demand for British goods and services.
The British current account surplus would be reduced at the same time with a reduction of 
foreign current account deficits. Eventually, gold flows stopped when external balance 
was reached. The same process worked in reverse to eliminate a current account deficit in 
Britain. (This mechanism worked only for extremely short periods, and it was never used 
in situation of financial crisis.)
1.4 The Bank Rate of the Bank of England: The Main Monetary Policy Instrument
Maintaining the gold standard became the primary objective of the Bank’s actions. 
Achieving both protection of gold reserves and economic growth were to become a major 
concern for the Committee of Treasury. The Committee of Treasury was composed of 
twelve members, most of them former governors of the Bank. The Governor of the Bank 
was required, according to the Bank statutes, to inform and consult the Committee of 
Treasury on major concerns of the monetary policy. The Committee of Treasury believed 
that an effective bank rate meant a leading rate and not a follower. We need to remember 
that the Bank o f England competed with other commercial banks, and each bank could 
determine autonomously its own rate. The Committee of Treasury wanted that the bank 
rate to determine (somehow) all other market rates. Consequently, the bank rate was 
supposed to lead the market rates, and not vice-versa.
15
The Bank realized that in order to have an influence on the money market it 
needed to take measures to encourage further the money market business with the Bank. 
Such steps were taken in the 1890s and they were accompanied by an increased presence 
of the Bank’s intervention in market conditions. The accepted doctrine was the fixing of 
the bank rate that would be announced weekly.
Sayers (1976, Vol. I, 28-9) asserts that “there is not the slightest indication in the 
Court or Committee of Treasury records of the reasoning on which each week’s action 
was based.” However, there is plenty of evidence that the Bank’s main objective consisted 
in “preventing gold from leaving the country, or of attracting gold to the country.” (Ibid., 
p. 29) The bank rate would be lowered when it was completely out of touch with market 
rates and circumstances did not render it necessary to induce the import of gold. We can 
see that the Bank’s objectives did not have anything to do with the balance of trade or 
payments, the price level, the supply of money, employment, or speculation tendencies. 
Securing gold reserves was the main concern of the day. It has been noted (Ibid., p 32) 
that the Bank would raise the rate faster than it would reduce it.
I f  gold reserve were adequate and the market rate was high, the Bank would 
respond in a less effective way to move the market rate down. In other words, there 
existed an asymmetry in the Bank’s manipulation of its rate. The rate was supposed to be 
much more effective when the gold reserve would be depleting. For instance, when gold 
was exported the Bank would increase its rate immediately. Of course, the gold would 
start to return to Britain. In this instance, the Bank did not reduce its rate to the former 
level as fast as it had increased it.
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Another issue of concern in the gold standard equation was the high seasonality of 
the demand for money. For the Bank’s leaders it was very difficult to discern between 
permanent and seasonal factors. In October, for instance, there would be an outflow of 
gold from Britain to the US due to the increased demand for gold of the US during the 
harvest time (US had a very inelastic money supply), situation in which regularly the bank 
rate needed to be increased. If the Bank leaders believed that in December gold might be 
coming back into England, then they should not have intervened in the money market.
Had the Bank not changed its rate, at the end of the year the absolute level of reserve 
would have stayed intact and interest rates would have been less volatile. Consequently, 
because of seasonality, the Bank gained a greater margin of discretionary action. (It could 
increase the bank rate or it could not, depending on its own views on the economic 
situation.)
The London bill market determined the amounts of gold export and import. In 
other words, if a trader would have found it cheap to discount a commercial bill at a 
London bank he could have performed more transactions in England, and more gold 
would have come into England. Thus, if the Bank could influence the London bill market 
(the discount rate) using its bank rate it gained more predictable control over gold 
movements. In fact, in 1890s the Bank began expanding both its lending operations 
(mainly by discount and advance) and its advances operations only. The Bank extended 
the eligibility of bills it would take from ordinary customers and thus the limit o f eligibility 
increased from 3 to 6 months to maturity.
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Another issue connected to making the bank rate more effective was the method 
that the Bank of England would use to operate more directly on influencing market rates. 
The Bank did not carry a portfolio of bills it could sell to take money off the market. An 
alternative to selling bills was for the Bank to reduce the funds available in the market for 
the financing of bill’ purchases by the discount banks. The Bank had either to sell a 
security of some kind or borrow funds that would otherwise be lent to the market. 
Borrowing was the preferred method used between 1891 and 1914. (Sayers, Vol. 1, p. 38) 
It was surprising that the biggest customer of the Bank, the Exchequer, did not provide 
any help in this matter. Only after 1914 did the Exchequer accept that the Bank could use 
its notes to influence the market rate.
The movements of the bank rate were directed at protecting the gold reserves. The 
rapid changes in the bank rate would hurt trade and industrial activity. A high bank rate 
would increase the discount rate and merchants would find it more expensive to finance 
their activity. We need to keep in mind that discounting was the main source of external 
financing for the vast majority of economic agents. Under these circumstances, at the end 
of the 19th century, the Bank became aware of the broader effects of its policies. In the 
1900s it avoided the more extreme increases of the bank rates as much as possible, and it 
resorted to other measures with the objective to evade or moderate actual rises in bank 
rate. After the crisis of 1905-1907, the Bank required its branches to “avoid as much as 
possible any curtailment of our regular customers for trade purposes/’ (Ibid., p. 45) Also 
it advised commercial banks to cut down commitments to finance speculation in New 
York. (p. 44)
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Although the classical gold standard prohibited it, the Bank pursued a policy of 
altering the gold price in order to encourage or discourage gold export or import. 
Normally, the Bank calculated appropriate buying and selling prices for the principal 
foreign gold coins, which would leave shippers indifferent between handling gold or other 
forms of gold coins, while leaving the Bank a margin of profit when a quantity of coins 
was resold in the same form. Theoretically, this should have been a stable mechanism for 
the free import and export of gold.
But, on occasions, the Bank altered unilaterally (without a counter-actions from 
the part of the corresponding foreign central bank) the price of gold of some foreign coins 
in order to defend its gold reserve. If  the Bank did not want some specific gold coins to 
leave the Bank’s vaults, it would simply increase the selling price of those coins. Because 
of this increased price, commercial banks or other money market operators were 
discouraged from buying those specific gold coins (from the Bank reserves). On the 
contrary, if it wanted to attract some gold coins into its vaults, it would just increase the 
buying price of those coins. Sayers argues that “governors sometimes decided that one or 
another of theses devices was useful in the over-riding task of ensuring adequacy of the 
gold reserve.” (p. 51) Often this policy of direct intervention on the gold market was 
accompanied by a change in the bank rate. The efficiency of such combined policies 
increased, but the frequent and, sometimes, major fluctuations of the bank rate were a 
major concern for the Bank‘s leaders.
The 1906-7 American crisis proved that the bank rate combined with borrowing 
were effective methods of controlling the monetary market. In the spring of 1906 the
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economic difficulties in the US (caused by an increase of the interest rates) had depleted 
the Bank of England’s gold reserve. The first reaction of the Bank was to increase the 
bank rate. In August when speculation in New York increased, the Bank used borrowing 
in the discount market to increase the market rate. This step was not enough to stop gold 
exports and it was combined with an increase in the bank rate. Latter on, these measures 
still were not sufficient and the Bank started discriminating against the paper on which 
money had been raised for lending to speculators in New York.
The selling price of the American eagles was raised to its maximum, but market 
rates were continually above their official rate. Yet, a new set of similar operations were 
undertaken and the results became observable. The gold imports increased and the bank 
rate eventually decreased. In October of 1907 the crisis gained momentum once again.
The Bank did not hesitate and took one more step to prevent a new gold export wave. 
Since there was a correlation between the gold reserve and the interest rate, the Bank 
intended to avoid any increase in the interest rate that could have affected the British 
economic activity. In addition, it refused to take any long-dated bill, so that although 
market borrowing further increased, market rates remained above official rate. In 
November 1907 the Bank had to increase its rate to unprecedented levels not seen since 
1873 (a rate of 7 per cent). Because of this high rate, by December 1907 gold was coming 
into Britain from twenty-four countries. (Sayers, p. 59) At the end of January 1908 the 
bank rate had fallen to 4 per cent.
In this chapter we have described the most important evolution the Bank of 
England passes through between 1694 and WWI. In more than two centuries, the Bank
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transformed from a purely private bank to a bank with goals similar to those of a 
contemporary central bank. Next chapter will present details about the evolution of the 
Bank of England during the difficult war years and until the Great Depression.
C hapter 2. The First W orld W ar and Its Im pact on the Bank’s Activity
2.1 From a Public to a Central Bank: The Crisis of 1914
The First World War marked, for the Bank of England, a significant step toward 
its transformation from a public to a central bank. Continental European countries 
anticipated the war for several months. The sterling or bills drawn in sterling were the 
most accepted mean of payment, and the world’s pressure on British denominated assets 
had visible repercussions on the British economy.
In the first part of 1914 fear of war caused heavy sales of internationally traded 
securities. Foreign borrowers were not able to remit in time (to the London accepting 
houses) funds for paying bills falling due in the next couple of weeks. Clearing banks 
found themselves in a liquidity crisis. The historical solution to any liquidity crisis of the 
banking system consisted in the Bank of England intervention. Commercial and discount 
banks would seek immediate cash in exchange for bills. Although the Bank of England did 
help the market in this way, the help would not be enough.
Following a decision taken by the Stock Trade Committee, on July 31, 1914 the 
London Stock Exchange was closed. The discount market’s borrowing at the Bank of 
England soared. Concomitantly, the gold position aggravated more the fragile situation in
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the money market. Foreign exchange rates were not favorable to the Bank of England, and 
gold was being exported in massive amounts. Clearing houses ceased or rationed the 
payments of gold to their customers in exchange for notes. This action exacerbated even 
more the pressure on the Bank of England’s gold reserve. The bank rate was more than 
doubled from 4 to 10 %. Because most countries lost their confidence in sterling and 
despite the attractive level of interest rate, there were no overseas funding pulling in as it 
used to be. The Bank remained closed for a week (between August 3rd and August 7th) 
and when it reopened the bank rate felt back to 5 %. The rate would remain at this level 
for the next two years o f war. When it reopened the First World War had already begun.
During the week when the Bank was closed, the Bank had to issue new notes. 
Technically, the Bank issued the new notes as loans to commercial banks in proportion to 
their deposit liabilities. Commercial banks paid an interest rate given by the bank rate, 
which was considered by the Bank of England as the minimum rate for lending. Since 
Scotland did not recognize the authority of the Bank of England, the Bank issued 
Treasury notes so that these could be accepted in Scotland. As a consequence, in a very 
short period, the Treasury notes issued by the Bank would become the main part of the 
circulating notes in both England and Scotland. After August 20th commercial banks took 
these notes instead of gold when drawing cash used to meet customers’ necessities.
These measures proved to be extremely effective in controlling the immediate 
crisis. Bill holdings were again liquid and the public confidence was restored. The Bank of 
England gained not only the public’s acclaim but the commercial bank’s support as well.
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However, the international effects of the war were devastating and London’s premier 
position on the international financial markets would never be restored (after the war).
2.2 Impact of the First World War on the Bank’s Activity
The crisis o f 1914 made clear that the Bank of England was the main protector of 
financial stability. Government intervention in the economy increased without any 
precedent. During the war years the government strictly regulated the capital markets, the 
imports, the distribution of food and vital materials, many retail prices, and the 
employment force. (Collins, 1988, p. 272-3) Also, the government directly controlled or 
managed the coal mines, the railways, and large portions o f the armaments industry. All 
these were accompanied by increased taxes and public borrowing. Consequently, the ties 
between the Treasury and the Bank of England fortified. In addition, the collaboration 
between authorities and money market institutions intensified.
The Bank of England pivotal role in the money and credit markets extended. It 
became the first lender to the government before markets had settled down. In November 
1914 the government initiated the long-term borrowing with a ten-year maturity. In 
addition, the government could borrow at much lower rates than the bank rate. In 1915 
the government issued a public offer o f war bonds, but the Bank of England had to step in 
because the offer was undersubscribed.
A different aspect of the precarious London financial situation during the war 
centered on the question of gold payments. Should gold payments be suspended? This 
question was a very sensitive one. John Maynard Keynes favored a limited maintenance of
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specie payments “so as to meet foreign demands, while making it extremely difficult and 
inconvenient for the ordinary man to get gold.” (Sayers, Vol. 1, 1976, p. 84)
The declared objectives of the Bank included its assurance that the banking system 
as a whole would facilitate the war effort; to conserve the principle of external 
convertibility o f the pound sterling; to lure to London as much foreign currency as 
possible; and to acquire the channels necessary to attract war supplies from other 
countries (mostly from over the Ocean). Before the US entered the war in March 1917 
there had been discussions between France and Britain, on the one hand, and the US and 
UK on the other hand, to buy as much war supplies as possible from the US. The 
financing would not be assured in all the cases by the European central banks. In those 
instances when there was no agreement between the purchaser and the buyer, some 
American intermediation firm (Morgans) would perform foreign exchange transactions, 
mobilization of U.S. securities held abroad, flotation of public debt, and overdrafts on 
behalf of foreign governments.
Little by little, the British balance of payments would swing one way only (always 
in deficit), and since there were fixed exchange rates, gold started crossing over the 
Ocean, first to Ottawa, and then to New York. Because the speculation was that more 
gold would be shipped over to the US, the value of the sterling would depreciate even 
more compared with the US dollar. At this point, in November 1915 the Treasury 
appointed a committee whose main role was to defend the exchange rate. Although the 
committee proved to be very effective with respect to other exchange rates, it was not 
effective with the US dollar exchange rate.
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The next step for the British Treasury was to borrow money directly on the New 
York market. In the Fall of 1916 Britain issued Treasury bills in New York. Yet, the Fed 
did not allow the American banks to buy these bills until February of 1917. (The US 
would enter the war next month.) After April 1917 the cooperation between the Bank of 
England and the Fed would intensify. As a consequence, more inter-government loan 
agreements would be signed in April and May of 1917.
During the remaining period of the war, the issue o f government stock reached 
unprecedented levels. Since both the Treasury and the Bank wanted to attract more 
“deposits” into their accounts, the Bank had to use an additional type of interest rate: 
Treasury Bill rate. For this reason the Bank started differentiating between deposit rates 
on home and foreign money. The rate on foreign deposits remained at a higher level than 
on domestic rates. (For instance, in January 1918 the rate on domestic deposit offered by 
clearing banks was 3.5 % whereas for foreign deposit was 4.5 %.) Commercial banks 
were also required to discriminate on the same basis. At the end of 1917, due to a higher 
influx of foreign deposits and severe restrictions on the exports of capital the Treasury bill 
rate fell from 4.75 to 4 %. Treasury hoped that these reductions of rates on the short term 
deposit would encourage people to invest in longer term bonds that were still issued.
For the Bank of England, the broader association with the government and with 
the conduct of monetary policy increased its influence within the domestic economy. Some 
of the responsibilities for managing the national debt could limit the Bank’s actions so long 
as the government had somehow more divergent interests than those o f the Bank. Only 
when the war was over could the Bank clarify its divergence with the Treasury. Generally
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speaking, by the end of the war, the Bank of England had already become a pillar o f the 
British economy, although its roles were not accurately defined and understood.
Chapter 3. The Return to Gold in 1925 and the Economic Crisis of 30s
3.1. The Accumulated National Debt and the International Cooperation after War
During the war, the Bank of England lost control almost entirely over the quantity 
of money in circulation. Since the Treasury had issued bills to cover the financing needs of 
the war economy, the market could get unlimited cash at the discount rate at which 
Treasury bills were available. In other words, there were two issuers of notes. In addition, 
both types of notes played similar roles. By the end of the war the government 
accumulated a huge deficit. Usually, the government issued new notes to pay off its 
“older” debt (consolidate its debt). Consequently, since the government wanted a lower 
rate to re-finance its debt, it preferred lower interest rates. (We need also to remember 
that, immediately after the war, a hypothetical monetary operator could borrow short-term 
money only from banks, but he could lend short-term money to either the Treasury or 
banks. Under such conditions one would deposit money where there was the highest 
expected interest.) At the same time, as we have seen earlier, the Bank of England used to 
increase the interest rate to protect its gold reserves. For this reason, there existed a 
contradiction between the Bank’s objective of protecting the gold reserve by increasing 
the rates and the Treasury’s needs of a cheaper way to finance its deficit.
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Basically there were three ways of “managing” the debt: running a budget surplus, 
consolidation of the short term debt, and increasing capital taxation. None of them proved 
viable as both a budget surplus and increased taxation would have jeopardized the 
governments fragile political situation. The consolidation of the short term debt was 
highly dependent on the bank rate, and the Bank of England could not afford to reduce it. 
The Bank of England was more concerned with restoring the gold convertibility o f sterling 
at its pre-war level ($4.86 = 1 sterling). In the US, interest rates were higher than in the 
UK. Had the British bank rate been reduced, the interest rate differential between the US 
and UK would have encouraged the gold exports from the UK to US. In fact, the market 
speculated (it was extremely profitable to export gold to the US) on this possibility and 
the sterling exchange rate undervalued constantly the official pre-war rate. Eventually, at 
the end of March 1919, the Bank decided to prohibit the export of gold coin or bullion.
Despite several major increases of the bank rate, by February of 1920 the US 
dollar/sterling exchange rate dropped to a minimum of $3.2/pound. (As compared to its 
pre-war benchmark of $4.86.) At the same time, the British economic situation was 
unprecedented. The economy operated at the same time at full employment, high inflation, 
and an unfavorable exchange rate. Under these circumstances, as well as facing major 
difficulties in settling down the inter-allies debt (the operational debt created during the 
war between France, the US, and Britain), the B ank of England started periodical 
consultations with the New York Federal Reserve Bank. The international contacts of the 
Bank had as the ultimate goal “to see the monetary systems of Europe once more bound 
together in an international gold standard.” (Sayers, Vol. 1, 1976, p. 120)
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Meanwhile, the British and American authorities tried to coordinate their actions 
so that the interest rate differential become minimal. In April 1920, the Bank had to cut its 
bank rate because the Treasury had just done the same thing for the T-bill rates. In the 
same day, even before this decision was to be carried out, the governor of the Bank 
“cabled to the New York Federal Reserve governor” (Ibid., p. 124) in order to determine 
him to make a corresponding reduction. For a couple of years this policy of continuously 
informing each other about everybody’s short term intentions was effective. The 
speculations against interest rate differential between the U.K. and the US ceased and by 
April 1922, the exchange rate of US dollars dropped to around S4.45/pound.
3.2 The 1925 Return to Gold
During 1923 not only British prices were growing faster than the American prices, 
but an agreement had been reached on the war debt to Washington. The immediate 
consequence of price level differential and supplemental debt-connected pressures was a 
substantial depreciation of the U.S. dollar - sterling exchange rate. The Bank wanted to 
increase its rate, but the Treasury opposed it vehemently. First, the unemployment rate 
was very high. Second, industry and trade would protest in the face of more expensive 
credit. Third, since the export of gold was forbidden until the end of 1925, the bank rate 
lost much of its pre-war significance. For these reasons, it seemed that the main monetary 
policy objective changed from preserving the gold standard to preserving the value of 
money. Keynes observed this discrepancy and believed that it was due to the stubbornness 
of the Bank to return to the pre-war parity rate. (Collins, 1988, p. 279) The pre-war
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parity rate over-valued sterling by about 10% and if it had been reinforced it would have 
hurt the British economy even more.
Although there were solid arguments invoked against a return to the gold standard, 
in April of 1925, the Bank decided to return to gold convertibility of sterling at its pre-war 
value. The new monetary environment imposed a withdrawal of the technical convertibility 
of notes into gold coins, and set a minimum of 400 ounces of gold (1700 sterling) for 
conversion of notes into bullion. Another concern was the concomitant existence in 
circulation of Treasury and Bank note issues. Because the Bank needed to know how 
much gold it should keep in its vaults, there was a consensus over the fact that only after 
two years o f the gold standard the Bank would amalgamate the notes. In November 1928, 
the Treasury and the bank notes in circulation were merged into a single Bank note issue.
The decision to return to the gold standard at its pre-war parity was a subject of 
contention. The policy options of the Bank and the government were severely restricted 
by the fact that every single policy had to be subordinated to the needs of sustaining the 
convertibility. Unemployment rate, balance of payments, government deficit, and gold 
reserves were the major unknown of the monetary and budgetary policy implications. For 
instance, “once a decision had been taken, an expansion within the domestic economy to 
reduce unemployment rates could not be countenanced if there was any danger that this 
might weaken the balance of payments and endanger the reserves.” (Collins, 1988, p. 281) 
Friedman and Schwartz (1982) have clearly shown that once the gold standard was re­
introduced in the U.K., the monetary deflation it caused damaged non-reversibly the 
macro-economic equilibria. The 1929-33 crisis highlighted the nature of this constraint.
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Had the British authorities allowed a ten per cent devaluation of sterling in 1925, 
the current account would have been improved by around 70 million within three years 
and the unemployment rate would have been smaller with 2.4 to 3.5 % than it actually was 
after five years. (Ibid., p. 283) Yet, if a devalued sterling had been adopted, there were 
high chances that other nations would have retaliated by either increasing trade 
restrictions, or devaluating their own currencies.
3.3 The Crisis of 1929-1933
After the gold standard was reinstated in 1925, the Bank’s policies diversified. One 
of the most important new policies consisted of the Bank’s increased role in trading 
foreign currencies. For instance, had the interest rate increased in New York, the Bank 
would have sold dollars (from its own reserves) in London market to protect the flow of 
sterling out of Britain. Doing this, the Bank could achieve two goals.
On the one hand, it preserved its gold reserves. On the other hand, the Bank 
gained an additional policy tool. It did not have to only increase its rate to protect the gold 
reserve. (This policy became controversial mostly when unemployment rate reached high 
levels.) Consequently, the Bank began keeping a reserve of foreign currencies in its vaults 
to intervene in the foreign exchange market, should the sterling deteriorate. The Bank 
faced two major obstacles in using this (new) policy of controlling the gold movements. 
One obstacle was given by the limited amount of foreign currencies the Bank possessed. 
Another obstacle was the unpredictable length of the period of time the interest rate 
differential persisted. During the war the monetary international coordination between
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France, the United Kingdom, and the United States increased but, after the war, it was not 
enough to prevent the individual economic crises. For example, from February to July of 
1928, the New York Federal Reserve discount rate went up from 3.5 to 5 %, while the 
Bank of England rate stayed at 3.5. The Bank’s reaction was first to sell dollars in 
London, and when its dollars reserves were diminishing to allow gold to leave to or from 
New York and to increase its rate to 4.5%. Even so, since in New York the call rate was 
between 7 and 8 % this policy proved ineffective. The Bank, once again, had to 
manipulate gold prices to impede the gold flow over the Ocean.
In August 1929, the New York discount rate increased to 6 % and the Bank of 
England was facing again a monetary crisis. At the end of September the London rate 
increased to 6.5 %. At the end of October 1929 the Wall Street Stock Exchange 
collapsed. It is still debated if the interest rates increases on either side of the Ocean had 
something to do with the stock exchange collapse (Friedman, and Schwartz, 1982). By 
May 1931, the bank rate was gradually reduced to 2.5 % while the New York rate was 
reduced to 1.5 %. These steps proved to be insufficient in the face of a very weak U.K. 
trade balance which uhad left London with short liabilities greatly in excess o f the gold 
and foreign exchanges reserves in the Bank.” (Sayers, 1976, Vol. II, p. 389) In May and 
June 1931, a series of liquidity crises took place in Germany and Austria. The foreign 
liquidity crises accentuated the London liquidity crisis. London tried to defend its currency 
against speculation expecting devaluation by taking international loans. Between July and 
August 1931, New York and Paris provided the Bank of England over 180 million pounds 
in loans to help it to defend the short term obligations.
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In September 1931, Britain suspended gold convertibility of sterling. Some major 
factors have determined the Bank to take this drastic step. There have been three 
important causes behind this decision: i) the huge UK trade deficit, ii) the over-valuation 
of sterling, and iii) the increased budget deficit. (Collins, 1988, p. 284; Sayers, 1976, 
p.3 87-415) The first two causes were inter-related. Had the UK reduced the gold content 
of sterling, the “value” of British purchases abroad would have decreased. (As I 
mentioned before other countries would have done the same thing.) Thus, the trade deficit 
could have been reduced by simply changing the gold definition of sterling. At the same 
time, since foreigners had more short-term claims on Britain and British investments 
abroad were predominantly for long terms claims “the claims on Britain could be 
liquidated more quickly than British claims on foreigners.” (Collins, 1988, p. 288)
As far as the budget deficit, the Treasury-notes that were exchanged in 1928 for 
the Bank-notes put additional pressure on the money market behind the Bank’s control.
So long as the unemployment rate in the UK was at over 10 %, the Bank hesitated to 
increase its rate, the bank rate had lost much of its pre-war effectiveness.
The Great Depression affected most of the world’s leading economies. Income 
contracted, prices deflated, profits decreased, and the bankruptcies rose. Unemployment 
rates reached unprecedented levels. The UK felt the effects of the world recession.
London lost much of its former international position.
Getting off the gold standard in 1931, the Bank of England gained the freedom to 
change its monetary policies much faster than under the gold standard. Although 
theoretically the gold standard did not give too much room for discretionary actions,
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during periods with high unemployment rates the Bank had either delayed to obey the 
rules o f the game or changed them. Until 1931, the discretionary actions of the Bank were 
occasionally determined by the government’s interests. After 1931, the government’s 
interests became the main discretionary objectives for the Bank. (Which basically meant 
that the Bank gave higher priority to public interest, such as unemployment or real wage.) 
During the 1929-33 crisis the Bank’s collaboration with the government increased in order 
to attenuate the devastating effects of unemployment and price deflation.
Immediately after the suspension of gold convertibility the pound depreciated, and 
exports increased. France, in 1936, and the US, in 1933, followed Britain in going off the 
gold standard, but the lag helped Britain to encourage domestic consumers to buy 
domestically-produced goods. (In his period the relative sterling price of imports had 
increased.) During the Great Depression years the Bank and the Treasury decided to 
manage the exchange rate. The exchange rate floated freely but the authorities reserved 
the right to intervene in the supply and demand of foreign currencies at any time. This 
period came to be known as a “dirty float” exchange rate. (Collins, 1988, p. 296) There 
was established an intervention fund with the objective to “reduce the amplitude of 
fluctuations (of the exchange rate) without seriously influencing long-term trends in 
sterling’s value.” (Ibid.)
In addition to controlling the sterling’s exchange rate, the Bank of England had 
also used a policy of “cheap money” to encourage economic growth and diminish the 
national debt. Ifin  October 1929, at the beginning of the crisis, the bank rate was 6.5 % it 
was only 2 % by June 1932. (Collins, 1988, p. 298, and Sayers, 1976, p.430) Although
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many serious problems remained after 1932 the use of the “cheap money” policy stopped 
the decline of the economy and it encouraged the economic recovery. In 1937 industrial 
production reached its pre-WW II-war peak and grew at a rate of 7.8 % p.a. (Collins, 
1988, p. 301)
3.4 Summary of Historical Events
October 1694 - The Crown chartered a private bank, the Bank of England, to 
finance the war.
1873 - Bagehot, Walter published Lombard Street: A Description of the Money
Market, the first theoretical study to suggest that the Bank of England be a 
lender of last resort “irrespective of anything.” (Sayers, vol. 1, 1976, p.
47)
1800 - The National Bank of France was created.
1844 - Gold standard fully introduced in Britain.
1876 - The National Bank of Germany was founded.
1878 - The National Bank of Italy was created.
1877 - Treasury bills issued weekly on tenders kept by the British Treasury at the
Bank of England.
1890s - The Bank of England adopts measures to encourage the money market 
business with the Bank in order to achieve a greater control of the market 
interest rates
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1906-1907 - American financial panic that resulted in massive gold exports from 
Britain to the US. To protect its gold reserves, the Bank of England 
increased the bank rate to an unprecedented level of 7 %.
July 31, 1914 - August 7, 1914 - Due to the war, the London Stock Exchange and 
the Bank of England closed. Gold payments suspended.
November 1914 - The Treasury initiated long term (over 1-year) borrowing.
The Federal Reserve System begun its operation.
April 1917 - The US entered the WWI.
1922 - International Monetary Conference of Genoa aimed at restoring 
the international gold standard and settling inter-allies debt.
1925 - Gold standard exchange rate parity restored at its pre-war level.
1929-1933 - Great Depression.
Chapter 4. The Founding of the Fed and Some Theoretical Considerations on 
the Altered Behavior of Interest Rate After 1914
4.1 A Brief Historical Overview of the Founding of the Fed
Between 1863 and 1913 the structure of the US banking system and its activity 
was mainly determined by the provisions of the National Banking Acts of 1863, 1864, and 
1865. These Acts were drafted to both solve the problems of the financial system that had 
existed before the Civil war and to increase revenue for the North during the Civil war. 
Before the Civil war, the frequency of financial panics as well as the number of bank notes
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in circulation was very high. One of the most notable successes of the Acts was the 
elimination of multiplicity of note issue that had existed prior to the war. Yet, the major 
cause of financial panics (an inelastic money supply) was not eliminated. The supply of 
money remained greatly inelastic, and for this reason, the frequency of financial panics 
continued to remain extremely high. (Miron, 1986, p. 129) In order to understand lack of 
money supply elasticity one has to understand the tendency of the money supply to 
contract in exactly those periods o f the year when it was needed most.
For instance, the large proportion of agriculture in national income had major 
economic consequences during two major seasons. One was in the spring planting season, 
and the other one was in the fall crop-harvesting season. During these periods not only did 
farmers need more currency and credit to have the seasonal work done, but corporations 
were required to pay quarterly interest and dividend settlements. Although the dynamics of 
each financial panic was different, the trigger element of every panic was the same. There 
was an increased demand for bank reserves that could not be satisfied for all parties 
simultaneously in the short sun.
The events that precipitated the creation of the Fed started with the financial panic 
of 1907, which accelerated the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland Act (enacted in June 
1908) and the creation of the National Monetary Commission. On the one hand, the 
Aldrich-Vreeland Act was designed to give New York City Banks greater powers in cases 
of emergencies. On the other hand, the National Monetary Commission was assigned the 
task o f studying international banking systems in order to determine the future of the 
American banking system. In 1910 the Commission published a report that recommended
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the creation of the Federal Reserve System. In 1913 the US Congress passed the Federal 
Reserve System Act, and in November 1914 the twelve banks of the Fed opened for 
business. (Barsky, e ta l ,  1988, p. 126)
The Fed was mainly created to eliminate seasonal interest rate fluctuations in the 
US by using an “elastic currency.” Consequently, the Fed would introduce “appropriate 
movements” into the supplies of currency and high-powered money. Actually, the Fed 
was supposed to increase the money supply during the spring and fall seasons, when the 
demand for money was at its highest levels. Also, the Fed would try to eliminate the inter­
regional interest rate differentials.
The effects and the timing of the Fed’s actions remain controversial. The next two 
sections will present the main issues concerning the much debated impact of the central 
bank’s founding on the time series behavior of interest rates.
4.2 Interest Rate Smoothing
According to its statutes, the Fed sought to smooth nominal interest rate 
movements occasioned by transitory disturbances to money demand, and/or aggregate 
supply. In other words, the Fed tried to control nominal interest rates directly. Using basic 
assumptions on money demand, money supply, and a relationship between the nominal 
interest rate, the real interest rate, and the (expected) inflation rate, Goodfriend (1987, 
1988) presented the mechanism of interest rate smoothing. Goodfriend (1988) believed 
that “at each point in time, the money supply rule allows the public to form a determinate 
expectation of the future nominal money stock.” (Goodfriend, 1988, p. 229) At the same
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time, the relationship between money supply and money demand would determine the 
nominal level of interest rate.
If the central bank pursued a future price level target (so that the inflation rate 
were stationary) “nominal interest rate smoothing would make the real interest rate shock 
move the current price level around.” (Ibid., p. 229) In reality, the central bank would not 
be indifferent to the idea that the current price level was erratic. For this reason, a central 
bank wishing to “minimize price level forecast error and smooth nominal interest rates can 
create the necessary inflation or deflation by moving the expected future price level around 
instead.” (Ibid., p. 231) Under such circumstances, the error variance of both price level 
and money stock forecast go to infinity. Despite the lack of theoretical support of 
Goodfriend’ s model “it appears that interest rate smoothing is a policy widely followed 
by world central banks because they believe that the financial stability it buys is worth the 
cost in increased price level instability.” (Ibid., p. 231)
Goodfriend’ s model did not accommodate for either institutional or instrumental 
policies that could compensate for the theoretical lack of stability of a monetary system 
where central bank followed interest rate smoothing. In addition, Goodfriend did not 
consider incorporating the rational expectations theory into the interest rate smoothing 
theory. Assume that one anticipates that, starting with a given point, interest rates cease to 
fluctuate as it happened in the past, then she/he will modify the expected (future) level of 
both money supply and demand. As we will see in the next section, there is plenty of 
empirical evidence indicating that, after 1914, interest rate smoothing was practiced by the 
Fed.
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4.3 Literature Review
Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987) published a very influential article related to the 
adjustment o f expectations to a change in regime. The main focus o f their study consisted 
of an investigation of the impact on economic decisions of the newly created economic 
environment that appeared in the US after the founding of the Fed. Basically, they 
questioned the speed with which the economy moved to a new level of rational 
expectations. According to the expectations theory of the term structure, the long-term 
level of interest rate would be related to current and expected future short-term rates. The 
future expected change of the present interest rate is greatly influenced by currently 
available information.
Had one known that an institution was supposed to eliminate the large fluctuations 
of interest rates, both over time, and geographically, the absolute value of future expected 
changes of the interest rate would have been lower. Consequently, economic decisions 
would have been modified by the presence of such an institution. The Fed openly asserted 
that it “will put an end to the annual anxiety from which the country has suffered for the 
last generation about insufficient money and credit...” (Ibid., p. 360)
Mankiw, etal, (1987) found that “the evidence strongly indicates that financial 
market participants understood the intentions of the new institution.” (p. 361) They 
analyzed the three-month time loan rate series available at New York banks for the first 
week of each month between 1890 and 1933. Between 1890 and 1910 short rates “were 
quickly mean-reverting and highly seasonal.” (p. 358) From 1920 to 1933 interest rates
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were close to a random walk. This proves that, between 1910 and 1920, a major change in 
the stochastic process generating short-term interest rates occurred.
They also tested the rational expectations theory. In addition to the three-month 
rate, they used the six-month rate series to determine if the long rate included an 
expectation of a future shock. Thus, a change in the stochastic process generating short 
rates needed to modify the theoretical relationship between short and long rates. So long 
as “shocks to the short rate were less persistent in the 1890-1910 period than in the 1920- 
1933 period, the long rate should be less responsive to the short rate in the 1890-1910 
period.” (Ibid., p. 359)
Because the 1910-1920 period leaves much to speculate about the causes of the 
changed behavior of the stochastic process of (short-term) interest rates, the authors 
performed switching regression techniques in order to determine the most likely date for 
this change. They found that “the most likely date for the change in the stochastic process 
of the short rate is between December 1914 and March 1915.” (p. 359) The Fed began its 
operations in November 1914. The results strongly suggest that immediately after the Fed 
had begun to operate, market participants fully became conscious of its role.
Consequently, a new rational expectations equilibrium point was rather quickly attained.
Angelini (1994) asserted that Mankiw e ta l  (1987) did not fully consider some 
historical events and institutional changes in the New York money market that might have 
had an impact on short-term rates. The three-month data series used by Mankiw et al. “is 
affected by errors” (Angelini, 1994, p. 562) for the 1908-1918 period. Fishe and Wohar 
(1990) noted that in the original sources there were missing observations, reported
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as nominal, or observations with other further conditional qualifications (i.e. , that a 
commission was paid to the lender). For the 1890-1907 period the three-month data series 
had 72 observations which were in error, whereas for the 1918-1933 period, 19 
observations were in error. (Fishe and Wohar, 1990, Table 1, pp. 970-71)
Angelini (1994) argued that the Aldrich-Vreeland Act (according to which call and 
time loans on the New York money market were fully collateralized) enacted after the 
1907 panic, had a major role in the elimination of future financial panics and thus it deeply 
affected short-term interest rate behavior. For this reason, if one wanted to test for the 
effects of the Fed’s founding on interest rate behavior they would need to eliminate the 
periods of financial panics. (This is so because a simple AR model would fail to predict the 
occurrence of a financial panic.)
Another point made by Angelini against the “Fed effect” was the fact that during 
the First World War the New York money market was under the control of the Money 
Committee. The Money Committee permanently changed the functioning of the money 
market. When the war ended, the money market had already been altered and it would not 
be necessary to analyze a longer time frame than 1908-1918. Angelini considers that the 
shift in the series of the short-term interest rates between 1890-1910 and 1920-1933 
subperiods might have occurred in at least two stages over the analyzed period. Mankiw et 
al (1987) looked specifically for only one break point in the period they considered. In 
conclusion, the choice of sample period has tremendous implications on testing for the 
“Fed effect” on the short-term interest rate behavior.
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For the 1908-1918 period, Angelini (1994) showed that “there was no parameter 
shift in the years astride the foundation of the Fed or that a parameter shift is impossible to 
detect because o f the low power o f my tests.” (Ibid., p. 564)
After this critique, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1994), in a reply, studied again the 
short-term interest rate behavior for the 1890-1933. They found that the analysis of the 
time series behavior of the three-month rate had to consider both the 1907 financial panic 
and the 1917-1919 period of administered interest rates. Also, the Aldrich-Veerland Act, 
passed in June 1908, “was a major step towards preventing financial panics and can 
indeed be considered as an initial move toward the creation of the Fed.” (Ibid., p. 548)
The Aldrich-Veerland Act was supposed to expire in June 1914, but because the 
Fed was due to open for business in November 1914, the Act was prolonged for another 
year. Fishe and Wohar (1990) noted that “the U.S. Treasury, acting under Aldrich- 
Vreeland, issued over $382 million in emergency currency during the year following June 
1914”. After using an AR(1) model and F-statistic for more sub-periods that in their initial 
study, Mankiw et al. (1994) found that “the exclusion of data points affected by the 
aftermath of the 1907 panic is crucial to the finding of no structural change, and in my 
view is warranted by the fact that the threat of banking panics had already been largely 
defused by the Aldrich-Vreeland Act.” (p. 551) However, the most important conclusion 
is that the founding of the Fed was not necessarily responsible for the changed behavior of 
short-term interest rates. Angelini (1994) argued for two more potential switch points: the 
Aldrich-Veerland Act of 1908, and the Money Committee which administered effectively 
the short term rates between 1917 and 1919. Subsequent empirical results will show that
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in the UK, there were identified statistical signs of changed behavior of the short-term 
interest rate prior to the founding of the Fed, in 1914.
Miron (1986) showed that after the creation of the Fed the “frequency of financial 
panics and the size o f the seasonal movements in nominal interest rates both declined 
substantially.” (p. 125) In other words, he extended even further the implications of the 
Fed’s founding in 1914. The seasonal open market policy conducted by the Fed 
eliminated seasonal movement in nominal interest rates and decreased the frequency of 
financial panics. Thus, the regular actions of the Fed were consistently anticipated by 
market participants, with real positive effects on economic stability. This is in contrast to 
R. Barro (1977, 1978) who argued that “only unanticipated changes in money have real 
effects.” (Miron, 1986, p. 125)
For a researcher it is difficult to identify a unique neutral monetary environment in 
which both the anticipated and unanticipated policies can be easily distinguished. During 
1914 there occurred more events than the founding of the Fed. Some had been anticipated 
and some not. Which of these could be held responsible for the changed behavior of 
interest rate observed thereafter? If the unanticipated events (the gold standard elimination 
or the war) prevailed, Barro and Lucas would be correct, asserting that only unanticipated 
changes in money would have real effects. If the anticipated events (the creation of Fed 
and its expected actions) were more important, the rational expectations theory would be 
inconsistent. Sargent (1976) suggested that the debate would be clearer if one would 
analyze data from two or more different policy regimes.
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Miron (1986) analyzed the 1890-1933 period. He considered the occurrences of 
financial panics for the 1890-1914 sub-period and he showed that, although after 1914 
there were several economic recessions, only during the 1929-33 crisis did the banking 
system experience a financial panic. Using a Bernoulli distribution he clearly showed that 
“the data reject the hypothesis of no change in the frequency of panics at the 99 percent 
level of confidence.” (Miron, 1986, p. 131) In other words, the frequency distribution of 
financial panics suffered a (statistically) significant disruption in 1914. A financial panic 
supposed a combination of bank failures, bank runs, and stock market crashes. Usually it 
all started with an unexpected large deposit withdrawal or a very large loan default.
A second aspect of Miron’s paper accentuates the much smaller size of seasonal 
movements in nominal interest rate after 1914. He used weekly data for the interest rate 
on stock market call loans. Also, employing the loan-reserve ratio o f the whole banking 
system, he was able to determine that there was a reduction in the elasticity of loan supply 
with respect to the interest rate after 1914 as compared to the 1890-1914 period. This 
implied a smoother behavior of nominal interest rates after 1914. Clearly, in 1914 there 
was a clear shift in policy regime.
The question of direct and immediate causality between the Fed founding and the 
changed behavior of the short-term interest rate series has become even more 
controversial after an article published by Clark in 1986. Although Clark (1986) focused 
on deseasonalization of interest rates after 1914 in the US, he extended the analysis to 
more countries. He found that “interest rate seasonal disappeared in the U.S. and other 
countries approximately at the same time,” and in the U.S. case “interest rate seasonal
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ended approximately 3 years before the seasonal movements of currency and high- 
powered money changed.” (Clark, 1986, p. 76) Clark used data for the call money rate, 
60-90-day commercial paper rate, and 90-day time money rate, for two major sub-periods: 
1890-1913, and 1919-1932. Using sample annual autocorrelations of the first differences 
of both short-term Merest rates and currency in circulation, bank reserves, and high- 
powered money, (for the two sub-periods) Clark was able to demonstrate that the Fed’s 
manipulation of the supply of currency and high-powered money started after the 
seasonality of interest rate had already disappeared.
Although the Fed was created in 1914, the Fed begun the seasonal movements of 
currency in circulation after June 1917 and for high-powered money after September 
1917. At the same time, “American interest rate seasonal came to an end in early 1915.” 
(Clark, 1986, p. 91) Consequently, there was a 3-year lag between the moment when the 
seasonal fluctuations of the short-term interest rate ended and the time when the Fed 
started its counter-cyclical monetary policies. “It appears that interest rate seasonal 
disappeared roughly 3 years before monetary policy actions intended to eliminate it 
began.” (Clark, 1986, p. 114)
To extrapolate his finding, Clark studied the same sub-periods using the British, 
French, and German open market discount rates. He found that in all countries the interest 
rates had a very high seasonality prior to 1914. The British discount rate tended to rise 
between August and November. The German rates would tend to be higher between 
August and December, whereas the French rates would rise between September and 
November. During January, the English and German rates would tend to decrease and the
45
same phenomenon would be observable in February in France. “Comparing the pre-war 
and postwar estimates, we see that the average monthly changes of each interest rate are 
relatively subdued in the postwar period.” (Clark, 1986, p. 87)
Although interest rate seasonality seemingly disappeared concomitantly in most 
countries after 1914, Clark clearly rejects the idea that the Fed “simultaneously eliminated 
interest rate seasonals throughout the world.” (Ibid., p. 90) At that time, the U.S. lacked 
the financial power “to export interest rate seasonality.” (Ibid.) It would seem that if 
interest rate seasonality ceased at the same time all over the world, the Fed did not have 
anything to do with it.
After grouping the data in overlapping 5-year periods, Clark used a Q-statistic on 
the first three annual autocorrelations of the first differences of the time series. Because of 
the test’s limitation it was impossible to pinpoint the exact time of change in seasonality. 
Doing this he pointed to 1912-15 “as the period when interest rata seasonals came to an 
end in the U.S. and Great Britain.” (Clark, 1986, p. 94)
Another interesting test was performed using the basic properties of a forecasting 
model. According to these properties, the more seasonal is a series, the better are the 
chances that forecast values for that series would include a seasonal pattern. Should, all at 
once, that seasonality end, the forecast values would have failed more consistently to 
predict the actual values. This is an implicit test that assumes the building of a forecasting 
model for more sub-periods whose specifications does not change to accommodate for the 
lack of seasonality. One can estimate where the specification of the forecast model 
changes by looking at (say) the variance of the forecast errors for different sub-periods.
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Clark used a forecasting model based on ARIMA(1,1) for the money rate and a 
simple random walk model for 60-90-day commercial paper rate, 90-day money rate, and 
British open market discount rate. He concluded that “the forecasting tests suggested that 
seasonality ceased in the call money rate in March 1914, in the commercial paper rate in 
November 1914, in the time money rate in August 1914, and in the British open market 
discount rate in September 1914.” (p. 102)
Although it is true that interest rate seasonality ended in both the US and Great 
Britain in 1914, it is not clear why. The Fed could not influence the global money market 
as to determine the simultaneous elimination of seasonality in the US and Britain. Clark 
suggested some alternative explanations. One could be the suspension of the gold standard 
in 1914. Another one could be the massive gold imports into the US during 1915, and 
1916, and the increased supply of high-powered money.
Barsky, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1988) tested the influence of the 1914 
dismantling of the gold standard on the changes in interest rate behavior. They analyzed 
US. and British rates for the 1890-1910 and 1920-1933 periods separately. ’’The objective 
is to document the change in regime in a way that avoids problems of how the transition 
(to a new monetary regime) took place.” (p. 1130) The series they used were three-month 
time loan rate for the U.S. and three-month rate on the on bankers’ bills available in 
London. In both cases these were monthly observations, for the first week of each month.
The autocorrelation function for both subperiods and countries showed that in 
both countries the interest rate was mean reverting during the 1890-1910 period, and there 
was a significant negative autocorrelation. In the 1920-1933 period, the autocorrelations
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die out less quickly. The authors also performed regressions of the interest rate on its own 
lagged values, including some seasonal dummies. For the 1890-1910 period, “the 
coefficient on the lagged short rate is significantly less than one in both countries, and 
there is important evidence o f seasonality.” (p. 1131) For the 1920-1933 period, the 
interest rate was a random walk.
Barsky, et al (1988) integrated in their model the inflation rate and they were able 
to build a theoretical model for the Fed’s actions that could have changed interest rate 
behavior, “even if World War I and the breakdown of the classical gold standard had not 
occurred.” (p. 1136) The authors used switching regressions techniques and demonstrated 
that “both interest rates and inflation changed behavior with high probability sometime 
between the middle of 1914 and the middle of 1915 in both the U.S. and Britain.” (p.
1141)
Most interesting, Barsky et al. used the breakdown of the Bretton Woods fixed 
exchange rate regime in 1971 as a proof that the exchange rate regime, rather than the 
Fed, could not be held responsible for the altered interest rate behavior after 1914. In 
other words, what matters most is the behavior of the inflation rates, and the correlation 
across countries in inflation rather that in interest rates. As a matter of fact, the inflation 
correlation coefficients across the US and Britain were 38.8 % higher than the interest rate 
correlation coefficients for the 1890-1910 period, which were with 19.9 % higher for the 
1920-1933 period. “Inflation rates shows more correlation across countries in the flexible 
rate period, contrary to the usual expectation based on purchasing power parity 
considerations” (Barsky, e ta L , 1988, p. 1143-5)
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The breakdown of gold standard in 1914 was not accompanied by an observed 
change in the global linkages o f prices and interest rates. Contrary to what One might have 
expected, the gold standard breakdown at the beginning of World War I did not modify 
the self-imposed restrictions of the theoretical correlation between interest rates and price 
levels.
Fukuda (1995) performed an analysis of the altered behavior of interest rates and 
inflation rates for Japan, after the founding of the Bank of Japan, in 1882. Japan was not a 
major international economic force either during the first World War or prior to it. Unlike 
the US or Britain, one can not use Japan as an “exporter” of changes of interest rate 
behavior to other countries. From this prospective, the Japanese case could be taken as a 
benchmark.
Fukuda (1995) used the discount rate on commercial bills in Tokyo and Osaka. 
Data were monthly averages of daily rates. The silver standard was established in Japan in 
May 1885, the gold standard was legally introduced in October 1897, and the gold 
standard was removed in September 1914. Fukuda used a unit root test to reveal the 
timing in the change in interest rate behavior. The regression model was described in this 
case as rt = c + BrtA .(Where r = interest rate, c = a constant term, B  = the parameter to 
be estimated, t = the time period.) The estimation periods were May 1880- December 
1913, and January 1920-December 1935.
Based on these historical and statistical considerations, the author discovered that 
after October 1897 the coefficient on the lagged interest rate was close to 1 and the 
coefficient on the constant term was close to 0, implying that the interest rates were close
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to a random walk without drift. Before September 1897, the Z-statistic rejected the 
presence of a unit root in the interest rates. After October 1897, the test suggested that the 
unit root cannot be rejected at even 10 % level of significance. In other words, the 
introduction of the gold standard in Japan transformed the interest rate time series from 
stationary to non-stationary. We have seen that much literature came to the conclusion 
that the founding of the Fed in the USA transformed in the same manner the short-term 
interest rate time series pattern. “Although our results also imply that a similar change 
happened in Japan, the change took place much earlier than in other countries and long 
before the breakdown of the gold standard.” (p. 65)
In conclusion, even if the Bank of Japan was created in 1882 the Bank did not play 
a crucial role in the Japanese money market until much later. Although the Bank of Japan 
started performing interest rate smoothing in 1885 (when the interest rate came to have 
highly positive autocorrelations), it was only after 1897 that interest rates changed their 
behavior. This is somehow surprising, but Fukuda attributes it to “the imperfections in the 
Japanese financial system.” (p. 71) Because in 1880s there were simultaneously in 
circulation government notes, national bank notes, as well as specie coins, in addition to 
the convertible bank notes issued by the Bank of Japan, “the degree of interest rate 
smoothing was very limited at the beginning.” (Ibid.) “Only after the establishment of the 
gold standard the reforms for the interest rate smoothing were almost completed.”
In the United States and United Kingdom, only after the breakdown of the gold 
standard, in August 1914, did interest rate time series change behavior. Another cause, 
suggested by Fukuda, for the precocity of the changed behavior of interest rates in Japan
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was the fact that “Japan had a less strict gold reserve ratio objective under the gold 
standard.” (Ibid., p.72) Consequently, so long as the gold reserve ratio objective was 
weak under the gold standard, the Bank o f Japan could achieve its nominal interest rate 
smoothing objective under the gold standard as the U.S. and U.K. could after the 
breakdown of the gold standard.
4.4 Summary of the Literature Review
In conclusion, there have been expressed divergent opinions about the main 
cause(s) that determined the changed behavior of short-term interest rate as well as when 
the change occurred. Clark (1986) concluded that the founding of the Fed could not be 
held solely responsible for the altered behavior o f interest rate after 1914. Actually, he 
established that the Fed became actively involved in the US monetary markets after three 
years of existence, in 1917. In addition, he observed that the same phenomenon occurred 
in more countries, at around the same time. In an initial study, Mankiw et al. (1987) found 
the opposite thing. They analyzed monthly observations for short-term interest rate 
between 1890 and 1933. They concluded that the founding of the Fed was entirely 
responsible for the changed behavior of short-term interest rate
Angelini (1994), and Fishe and Wohar (1990) challenged Mankiw’s statement. 
They found that either the data used by Mankiw et al. (1987) contained many errors or the 
authors did not fully consider other historical events and institutional changes. Angelini 
(1994) pinpointed the Aldrich-Veerland Act of 1908 and the Money Committee o f 1917- 
1919 as potential sources for the changed behavior of short-term interest rate. Mankiw et
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al. (1994) responded to these observations with a reply in which they acknowledged that 
indeed other factors might well have influenced the changed behavior of short-term 
interest rate.
Miron (1986) used an indirect measure of the Fed’s implications on the US 
financial markets. The instability of the pre-Fed period was characterized by a statistically 
significant larger number of financial panics than during the post-Fed period. From this 
viewpoint, Miron (1986) considers that the founding of the Fed had a positive impact on 
the US economy. Also, he determined that after 1914 short-term interest rate had a 
smoother behavior. Combining these two findings, he believes that in 1914 there was a 
clear shift in policy regime caused be the founding of the Fed.
Barsky et al. (1988) tested the short-term interest rate behavior under both the 
gold standard and the free floating system. They concluded that the breakdown of the gold 
standard at the beginning of World War I was not responsible for the changed behavior of 
the short-term interest rate.
We will show that neither the founding of the Fed, nor the breakdown of the gold 
standard (both of which happened at around the same time, in 1914) were responsible for 
the changed behavior of British short-term interest rate after 1914. In the next chapter of 
this thesis we will analyze the time series properties o f the weekly data for the British 60- 
day draft rate between 1890 and 1933. We will try to discover if a structural break in the 
series occurred, and if it did, what was (or were) the most likely cause(s).
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Table I. Summary of L iterature Review
Authors (year)
Mankiw, Miron, 
and Weil (1987)
Angelini (1994)
Mankiw, Miron, 
and Weil (1994)
Fishe and Wohar 
(1994)
Miron (1986)
Data and Methodology
Monthly observations on 3- and 6-month 
loan rate at New York banks, (for the first 
week of each month) 1890-1933. Simple 
AR(1), autocorrelation analysis, 
maximum likelihood procedure, and 
Modigliani-Sutch relation between long 
and short term rates.
Used the same data set as Mankiw, et al. 
Also employed AR(1) analysis on a 
restricted time frame, between 1910 and 
1920. Considered historical and structural 
changes
Replied to Angelini. As suggested by 
Angelini, and using the same procedures, 
they considered more possible statistical 
breakpoints.
They employed the same series as 
Mankiw et al. Used weekly as well as 
monthly data. Also they corrected data 
errors. Used switching techniques in 
order to select the most likely switch dates 
of the time series.
Studied the occurrences of financial 
panics between 1890 and 1933. Seasonal 
movements of stock market call loan rates 
were analyzed. Also, studied the loan- 
reserve ratio of the whole American
Conclusion
Economic agents quickly understood 
that the founding of the Fed changed 
the stochastic environment in which 
they were operating. More precisely, the 
short term interest rate behavior 
changed sometime between October
1914 and March 1915, only because of 
the Fed.
Discovered that there are two additional 
potential switching points that need to 
be accounted for. The first point would 
be the financial panic of 1907 and the 
Aldrich-Vreeland act of 1908. The 
second would be the 1917-1919 period, 
when the Money Committee 
permanently altered the functioning of 
the American money market. The 
founding of the Fed had nothing to do 
with the altered behavior of interest rate 
time series.
The American financial panic of 1907 
together with the Aldrich-Vreeland act 
of 1908 had indeed very significant 
effects on the behavior of short-term 
interest rates. Still, the biggest break 
point in the time series occurred after 
1914.
For 3-month rates they found two 
switch points. One would be in August 
1909 and the other one in February
1915 (for the weekly data, it would be 
in December 1915). For 6-month time 
series the breakpoint would be June 
1912 (the same point was obtained 
when they used weekly data).The entire 
term structure of interest rate was not 
similarly affected by the founding of the 
Fed. There was no regime change in 
1914.
After the founding of the Fed the 
frequency of financial panics and the 
seasonal movements of interest rates 
diminished. He was able to show that, 
compared to the 1890-1914 period,
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Clark (1986)
Barsky, Mankiw, 
and Weil (1988)
Fukuda (1995)
banking system.
Monthly data on call money rate, two- 
and three-month commercial paper rate, 
and three-month money rate for two 
periods: 1890-1913 and 1919-1932. 
Included British, French, and German 
open market rates. (Arithmetic averages 
of weekly and daily observations). Used 
AR(1) analysis and forecasting models.
Monthly observations (first week of the 
month) of New York three-month loan 
rate and three-month rate oh bankers’ 
bills available on London. Employed 
AR(1) analysis and an integrated model 
of inflation and gold flow mechanism.
Used monthly (average) data on discount 
rate on commercial bills in Tokyo and 
Osaka. Performed ADF unit root tests for 
various sub-periods, between 1874 and 
1989.
after 1914 there was a reduction in the 
elasticity of loan supply with respect to 
interest rate. This is consistent with 
interest rate smoothing.
Although the Fed started its activity in 
1914, only starting with the second half 
of 1917 did the Fed begin the seasonal 
movements of currency in circulation 
and high-powered money in order to 
smooth interest rates. In fact interest 
rate seasonality disappeared between 
1912 and 1915 in both Europe and the 
US. It is obvious that the Fed did not 
have anything to do with the changed 
behavior of interest rate. Clark 
suggested other possible factors, such as 
the suspension of gold standard, or the 
massive gold imports into the US 
during the war.
In both US and Britain, inflation and 
interest rates changed behavior between 
the middle of 1914 and middle of 1915. 
The gold standard breakdown in August 
1914 did not influence the changed 
behavior of interest rates in either 
Britain nor the US.
Although the Bank of Japan (created in 
1882) started performing interest rate 
smoothing in 1885, the behavior 
of short-term interest rate series 
changed only after 1897. Since the gold 
standard was introduced in Japan in 
1897, it seems that its introduction (and 
not the breakdownof the gold standard) 
precipitated the change in behavior of 
interest rate time series, from stationary 
to non-stationary.
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Chapter 5. The Behavior of the British 60-day Draft Rate, 1890-1933
5.1 Data Description
Starting with the 1880s, the Bank of England used the bank rate as the main policy 
instrument aimed at controlling the gold flow in and out o f England. A higher British bank 
rate would make deposits of gold more attractive (in the form of sterling). A lower rate 
would allow for an export of gold to countries where the rate was relatively higher. (In 
theory, this mechanism would predict a stable equilibrium of gold and foreign exchange 
markets. In reality, there were more factors that altered the pure mechanism of the foreign 
exchange and gold markets, known as “the rules of the game.”) At the same time, the 
bank rate was used (by commercial banks) as a benchmark for discount rates which 
commercial banks would charge to their customers. The “60 days’ bankers’ drafts” was 
the discount rate the commercial banks would charge for a (commercial) draft with a 
period to maturity of up to 60 days.
A commercial draft is a check drawn by a bank on itself or its agent. In this 
instance, a person who owes money to another buys the draft from the bank for cash -and 
pays interest-, and hands it to the creditor who needs to have no fear that it might be 
dishonored. The draft was used only when a creditor did not want to accept an ordinary 
check (that was used mainly between well-known merchants). Since commercial banks 
assumed a higher than usual risk, they needed to charge the draft buyers a slightly higher 
rate than the rate charged ordinarily for discount operations. Moreover, commercial banks
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re-discounted most o f their commercial bills at the Bank of England’s counters, that used 
the bank rate as official discount rate.
The 60 days’ bankers’ drafts rate was determined daily by commercial banks. The 
bankers’ decision was based on the rate determined by the Bank of England. The 
Economist published weekly a special section dedicated to bank returns o f European 
(including Britain) and North American (US and Canada) countries. In this section of the 
Economist one finds information about discount and loan market in Britain. Daily data 
were reported on the (official) bank rate, bankers’ drafts rate, market rates of discount 
(for three, four, and six months) used by commercial banks, interest rates for loans, and 
the rate for deposit allowances.
The 2296 weekly observations of 60 days’ bankers’ drafts rates (henceforth 60DR) 
used in this thesis were gathered from the banks’ return section of The Economist 
between January 3,1890 and December 30, 1933. The rates consist of the average of the 
highest and lowest rates mentioned for Friday (of each week).
The data was provided to me by Professor Mark Wohar. I have thoroughly 
checked the data and I eliminated all data errors. Means and standard deviation were 
computed for both levels and differences of interest rates. These statistics are reported in 
Table II. Weeks in which changes in interest rates exceeded + or - 2.5 standard deviations 
were designated as outliers. For example, if the change between the interest rate in week 
11 and week 10 was above 2.5 standard deviations then week 11 was given a dummy 
variable (called d l l )  where d l l  was 1 in week 11 and 0 elsewhere. There have been 
identified 61 outliers (presented in Table III). Graph 1 shows the first difference of the
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60DR time series, together with the + or - 2.5 standard deviation bands (including 
outliers).
Table II. Basic Statistics of the 60DR Time Series and First Difference
Statistic : 60DR Time Series First Difference 60DR
Mean 3.1874 0.000523
Maximum 7.19 3.22
Minimum 0.38 -1.5
Standard Deviation 1.444 0.2869
The presence of (all) 61 outliers is entirely explained by the changes of the bank 
rate levels performed by the Bank of England. As we have seen in the previous chapters, 
the Bank increased its rate when the export of gold would put the Bank’s reserves in 
danger of depleting. The Bank reduced the bank rate when the import o f gold would 
increase.
For instance, on August 4, 1893 the 60DR increased from 1.63 to 2.88 % and a 
week later, the 60 DR jumped to 4.25 %. During the same period, the bank rate increased 
from 2 to 3 %, and then to 4 %. The Economist suggested that “the withdrawals of gold 
for the US have continued on a large scale, and market rates hardened, in anticipation of a 
further advance in the bank rate. The decision of the directors to advance the (bank) rate 
to 4 % was, therefore, folly expected, and the market at once responded by bringing its 
rates for fine paper of all dates up to and over the bank level. Somewhat unsettled
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conditions prevail, and in the event of the higher rates failing to attract gold from the 
Continent, where the stocks are being tightly held, it is quite possible the Bank may have 
to take further steps for the protection of its rapidly diminishing reserve. The Imperial 
Bank of Germany has advanced its rate 1 per cent.” ( The Economist. August 12, 1893, p. 
984)
On January 3, 1908, the 60DR decreased from 6.38 to 5 %, while the bank rate 
was reduced from 7 to 6 %. The Economist comments that “The reduction of the bank 
rate, while it had been hoped for, was hardly expected so soon after the turn of the year. 
Next week was regarded as the most probable date for the first reduction. It was very 
cordially received, being taken as an indication of a belief in the highest quarters that the 
worst o f the American trouble is over. In the last few days of December a very large sum 
was borrowed by the market from the Bank, and loan rates ruled at 6.5 to 7 %. ” ( The 
Economist. January 4, 1908, p. 34)
Table III. The Outliers of the Time Series (Observations whose values changed 
in one week by more than 2.5 standard deviations -in absolute value-)
No. Date Previous
Value
Current
Value
Change
(0) a ) (2) (3) (4)=(3)-(2)
1 July 11, 1890 3.38 4.13 0.75
2 August 1, 1890 3.88 4.75 0.87
3 September 26,1890 4.00 4.75 0.75
4 November 7, 1890 4.88 5.75 0.87
5 December 5, 1890 4.75 3.75 -1.00
6 January 9, 1891 3.63 2.75 -0.88
7 January 16, 1891 2.75 2.00 -0.75
8 July 17, 1891 1.13 1.88 -0.75
9 October 30, 1891 2.25 3.31 1.06
10 December 4, 1891 3.38 2.5 -0.88
11 January 8, 1892 2.75 • 2.00 -0.75
12 March 4, 1892 2.75 2.00 -0.75
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13 May 13, 1892 1.00 1.88 0.88
14 May 20, 1892 1.88 0.94 -0.94
15 April 28, 1893 1.44 2.25 0.81
16 May 12, 1893 2.75 3.75 1.00
17 June 2, 1893 4.00 2.50 -1.50
18 June 9, 1893 2.50 1.50 -1.00
19 August 4, 1893 1.63 2.88 1.25
20 August 11, 1893 2.88 4.25 1.37
21 September 8,1893 3.75 3.00 -0.75
22 January 5, 1894 2.44 1.50 -0.94
23 April 8, 1898 2.88 3.63 0.75
24 May 27, 1898 3.25 2.31 -0.94
25 September 23, 1898 1.63 2.69 1.06
26 October 14, 1898 2.50 3.63 1.13
27 July 14, 1899 2.38 3.50 1.12
28 October 6, 1899 3.81 5.00 1.19
29 December 1, 1899 5.00 5.75 0.75
30 December 29, 1899 7.00 6.00 -1.00
31 January 12, 1900 4.75 3.75 -1.00
32 May 18, 1900 4.00 3.19 -0.81
33 July 20, 1900 2.81 3.81 1.00
34 October 19, 1906 4.38 5.38 1.00
35 January 4, 1907 5.94 4.94 -1.00
36 April 12, 1907 4.44 3.50 -0.96
37 November 1, 1907 4.50 5.69 1.19
38 November 8, 1907 5.69 6.75 1.06
39 January 3, 1908 6.38 5.00 -1.38
40 October 16, 1909 2.32 3.38 1.06
41 March 19, 1910 2.75 3.69 0.94
42 October 1, 1910 2.38 3.50 1.12
43 October 22, 1910 3.19 4.56 1.37
44 January 24, 1914 3.38 2.63 -0.75
45 August 1, 1914 (*) 2.21 Bank closed See note
46 August 8, 1914 (*) Bank closed 5.37 See note
47 September 12, 1914 4.44 3.34 -1.12
48 June 26, 1915 2.78 4.00 1.22
49 November 1, 1919 3.69 4.60 0.91
50 Novembers, 1919 4.60 3.69 -0.91
51 January 3, 1920 5.91 5.13 -0.78
52 February 7, 1920 4.88 5.66 0.78
53 April 17, 1920 5.03 5.88 0.85
54 October 9, 1920 6.69 5.82 -0.87
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55 April 9, 1921 6.37 5.44 -0.93
56 February 9, 1929 4.25 5.25 1.00
57 September 28, 1929 5.25 6.00 0.75
58 July 25, 1931 2.25 3.25 1.00
59 August 1, 1931 3.25 4.35 1.10
60 January 30, 1932 5.50 4.50 -1.00
61 February 20, 1932 4.94 4.00 -0.94
Note: Due to the beginning of First World War, on the first week of 
August 1914, the Bank of England was closed (between August 1 and August 7, 1914). In 
this interval, commercial banks used 5.5 % discount rate. (See also the source of data.)
For statistical and historical reasons, the time series under analysis uses the 5.5 % rate for 
August 1, 1914.
5.2 Postulated Hypothesis
The last section described how an accurate time series was obtained. In this section 
we will build a hypothesis based both on previous empirical works and historical events. 
The hypothesis is based on two major considerations. On the one hand, the founding of 
the Bank of England in 1694 was mainly connected with the sustenance of the Crown’s 
war effort. As described in previous chapters, for many historical and conjectural reasons, 
the Bank of England’s objectives changed substantially in the 1890s. On the other hand, in 
1914 the Fed was founded specifically with the intention of eliminating the seasonal 
behavior of short term interest rates. The issues we analyze are: Did the Bank of England 
adopt similar objectives to those of the Fed? If this is true, then when did it begin to have 
objectives similar to those of the Fed? In other words, when did the Bank of England start 
to behave as if it were smoothing interest rates?
Mankiw and Miron (1986) could not reject the view that the short-term interest 
rate was a random walk after the founding of the Fed, but not before. Miron (1986) 
demonstrated that the Fed removed a strong seasonal fluctuation in the nominal interest
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rate that ranged from about 6 % for the 1890-1914 period. These findings would suggest 
that the Fed acted to smooth interest rate behavior after 1914. Interest rate smoothing 
assumes that the money supply policy followed by the central bank allows the public “to 
form a determinate expectation of the future nominal money stock.” This policy, in turn, 
under specific circumstances lowers the expected future nominal money stock each period. 
(Goodfriend, 1988, p. 229)
Nonstationary short-term interest rate time series are consistent with interest rate 
smoothing. It is much agreed (Clark, 1986, Goodfriend, 1987, 1988) that if we find the 
60DR series non-stationary for a specific period, it is very likely that the Bank of England 
behaved as if it were smoothing interest rates (but without declaring it). In order to 
statistically test the 60DR series we use the first order autoregressive process, AR(1). In 
discussing the methodology of the analysis we will follow the paper of Holden and Perman 
(1994).
5.3 The Methodology
We consider the AR(1) process defined by
r t  =  B r t - \  +  e t  > t =  2 > • 0 )>
where rt stands for the 60DR at time t, B  would be the coefficient to be estimated, r t l 
stands for the lagged value of 60DR, and et define a variable (in sequence) of 
independently and identically distributed variables with zero mean and constant variance.
The process described by (1) is stationary when the estimated B  is less than one in 
absolute value, i.e. -1 < B < 1. (This is also called the stationarity condition.) If  and only if
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B  is 1, the AR(1) process described by (1) has a unit root. In this situation the AR(1) 
process with a unit root is non-stationary. Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981) developed a 
unit root test based on the null hypothesis that assumes B= 1, against the alternative 
hypothesis that B< 1. Suppose the estimated value of B  is b. Dickey and Fuller (henceforth 
DF) (1979) demonstrated that the statistic T{b- B) — T(b -1) has a limiting distribution.
The critical values for unit root tests based on the limiting distribution for the statistic 
were obtained by DF using Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
The values of rt of equation (1) are estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
techniques. For this reason, the estimation would lose much of its significance if we do 
not account for a constant term, past influence, outliers, and possible trend.
We subtract rtA from both sides of equation, and account for outliers, trend and 
past influence equation (1) becomes 
(2)
r, = Dr, = c + (5, -1)/-,., + (B2 - -  rt.2) + (5 3 -1)(t-,.2 - r,.3)+  ...+(BW -r,.w.,) +
+ Qt + 0,7;, + O2ro2+.. +Otrok + e,
Now, we replace (B„ -1) coefficients by Cw and we obtain eq. (3)
(3)
r, - t = Dr, = c  + C,t-m + C2(r„, -r:.2)+. +C„(rrw - r,_wA) + 0 /  + 0,rol +., +Okrot +e, 
where Dr is the difference between the level variable and its lagged value, c is a constant 
term, Cx through Cw are the estimated coefficients for the number of w-1 lagged values of 
the differenced 60DR series, t is the observed linear trend component for the lagged values 
included in equation, Ok are the dummy coefficients for the k  outliers of the series, and e 
stands for the random error term. Equation (3) is known as the augumented Dickey Fuller
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(henceforth ADF) regression. This time, because we have differenced eq. (1) the null 
hypothesis becomes H(0): Cx = Cj = 0 and is tested against the alternative hypothesis 
H(a): cx < 0. (Lower case of c means the estimated value )
In the next section we will use the ADF regression (equation 3) for different sub­
periods of 60DR time series. Based on historical considerations and previous empirical 
works, we hope to determine the most likely period when the stochastic processes 
generating the time series changed. In the historical and previous research light, we believe 
that the series changed its statistical behavior from stationarity to non-stationarity. 
Theoretically, some exogenous factors must have changed in order to alter the 60DR time 
series behavior. We will also try to suggest some of the historical factors that might have 
determined this change. Much of the literature asserted that the timing of the founding of 
the Fed determined the changed behavior of short-term rates in both Britain"and the US. Is 
this true?
5.3.1 Stationarity
Equations (1) to (3) help us to determine the nature of long-run movements of 
economic variables. More specifically, it is necessary to establish whether random 
disturbances have temporary or permanent effects on the level of a variable. A variable 
that has no tendency to return to its mean following a disturbance is known as non- 
stationary. I f  the impacts of a random disturbance were to dampen out over time, the 
variable is said to be stationary. The variable could grow around a trend, (a case in which 
the series is known as trend-stationary). Also, the series can be viewed in terms of its
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covariance over time. This is in opposition to a nonautocorrelated series which has 
covariance equal to zero. Mathematically, a time series is stationary if it has a constant 
mean for all time periods, and its covariance function does not depend on time.
A series is said to be integrated of order d, [1(d)], if it has a stationary invertible 
autoregressive moving average representation after differencing d times. Consequently, a 
series that is integrated of order zero, [1(0)], is itself stationary. The most common case of 
a non-stationary series is a unit root, or is integrated of order one, [1(1)]. Equation (1) 
describes a random walk process if et is a stationary disturbance term which is not serially 
correlated. This would be a special case of a non-stationary process. If  a variable evolves 
according to a random walk then shocks to that variable are cumulative and not ultimately 
self reversing.
A particular case would be given by equation (la)
(la) r, - r,., = a + e, . where et (mean zero and constant variance) is
serially uncorrelated, and a  is a parameter which can be considered the average predictable 
increase in interest rate in each period t. In this case, the time series follows a random walk 
with drift. Equation (lb)
(lb) rt - rtA = a + ut , where ut is stationary, describes a non-
stationary process integrated of order one, [1(1)]. (It was differenced once to be 
stationary.) As we can observe, the only difference between (la) and (lb) consists in the 
condition that determine the status of the error term If a series is integrated, then ut is 
stationary but might be serially correlated, whereas if it is a random walk, then et is
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serially uncorrelated. It is important to mention that an integrated process of order greater 
than zero has a variance that tends towards infinity.
5.4 Empirical Results
Clark (1986) suggested that the Fed begun seasonal movements of currency and 
high-powered money during the latter half of 1917 in order to eliminate the interest rate 
seasonality. At the same time, interest rate seasonals in both the US and Britain came to an 
end in 1914. Since the Fed could have “exported interest rate smoothing” to Britain in the 
second half of 1917, we tested for stationarity over more intervals of the 60DR time 
series. Table IV includes the t statistic for the coefficients of the ADF regressions. The 
null hypothesis, H(0) is that a unit root exists. We conclude that before mid-1917 the 
series was stationary and after mid-1917, the 60DR time series was non-stationary. This 
would imply that the Fed’s actions could have affected the behavior o f the British short­
term interest rate time series at the end of 1917 or at the beginning of 1918. At the same 
time, in order to fortify this finding, we need to study whether the 60DR time series 
changed its statistical behavior earlier.
Table IV. T-statistic of the ADF Regressions for the 60DR Time Series in the Second 
H alf of 1917.
Intervals Number
of
Observ.
Outliers T-statistic for 
the C l ADF 
Coefficients
Statistical
significance
Jan. 3, 1890-July 7, 1917 1435 48 -4.09* Reject H(0)
Aug. 4, 1917-Dec. 30, 1933 860 13 -2.08 Can’t Rej.H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Aug. 4, 1917 1439 48 -4.98* Reject H(0)
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Sept. 8, 1917-Dec. 30, 1933 853 13 -2.23 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Sept. 8, 1917 1444 48 -5.12* Reject H(0)
Oct. 6, 1917-Dec.30, 1933 849 13 -1.86 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Nov. 3, 1917 1449 48 -4.97* Reject H(0)
Dec. 1, 1917-Dec. 3, 1933 844 13 -2.15 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Dec. 3, 1917 1453 48 -6.11* Reject H(0)
Jan. 5, 1918-Dec.30, 1933 840 13 -1.99 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Jan. 5, 1918 1461 48 -5.84* Reject H(0)
Feb. 2, 1918-Dec. 30, 1933 835 13 -1.98 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Notes: (1) The actual regressions included also a trend component. Since in none of
regressions was the trend statistically significant we ignored it. In most cases the 
estimated coefficients for all outliers (dummy variables) are statistically significant.
(2) At 5% level of significance the critical t value for ADF statistic is -2.86 (for a 
very large sample).
(3) Source: Table 8.5.2 ofFuller (1976, p. 373).
(4) H(0) is the existence of a unit root.
Mankiw et al. (1987) shows that, in the US case, the short term interest rate 
behavior changed in November 1914, immediately after the founding of the Fed. This fact 
would indicate that, in a matter of days, economic agents understood the implications of 
the Fed’s announced targets. In consequence, the stochastic process generating the short 
term interest rate time series changed.
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Barsky et al. (1988) confirmed Mankiw et al.’s finding that the Fed was the main 
factor responsible for the changed behavior of short term interest rate time series. They 
also extended this conclusion to Britain. “The switch occurred with high probability 
sometime between the middle of 1914 and the middle of 1915 in both the US and 
Britain.” (1988, p. 1141) Based on these works, we used ADF regression equations to 
test for stationarity of the 60DR time series at the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915. 
Table V summarizes the t statistic for the C l coefficient of ADF regressions.
Table V. T-statistic of the ADF Regressions for the 60DR Time Series in the 
Second H alf of 1914.
Intervals Number
of
Observ.
Outliers T-statistic for 
the C l ADF 
Coefficient
Statistical
significance
Jan. 3, 1890-July 4, 1914 1278 44 -4.88* Reject H(0)
Aug. 1, 1914-Dec. 30, 1933 1013 17 -2.07 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Aug. 1, 1914 1283 44 -4.29* Reject H(0)
Sept. 5, 1914-Dec. 30, 1933 1008 17 -2.72 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Sept. 5, 1914 1287 46 -4.34* Reject H(0)
Oct. 3, 1914-Dec.30, 1933 1004 15 -1.93 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Nov. 7, 1914 1291 47 -4.65* Reject H(0)
Dec. 5, 1914-Dec. 3, 1933 995 14 -2.78 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Dec.5, 1914 1300 47 -3.96* Reject H(0)
Jan. 2, 1915-Dec.30, 1933 992 14 -2.68 Can’t Rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Jan. 2, 1915 1304 47 -4.21* Reject H(0)
Feb. 2, 1915-Dec. 30, 1933 987 14 -2.62 Can’t Rej. H(0)
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Notes: (1) The actual regressions included also a trend component. Since in none of
regressions was the trend statistically significant we ignored it. In most cases the 
estimated coefficients for all outliers (dummy variables) are statistically significant.
(2) At 5% level of significance the critical t value for ADF statistic is -2.86 (for a 
very large sample).
(3) Source: Table 8.5.2 of Fuller (1976, p. 373).
(4) H(0) is the existence of a unit root.
. Since the null hypothesis of non-stationarity o f the 60DR time series can not be 
accepted for all o f the coefficients of pre-1914 intervals, we conclude that the series 
remained stationary before the First World War or founding of the Fed. The 60DR time 
series was non-stationary for all sub-periods after the second half of 1914. Once more, 
corroborated by previous empirical works, we need to extend our search for a break point 
in the series.
As we have seen, using breakpoints of either 1917 or 1914 we find that the 60DR 
time series changed its statistical behavior. These findings imply that the series could have 
changed its behavior even sometime before the events of 1914. Angelini (1994) concluded 
that the Aldrich-Vreeland act enforced after the American financial panic o f 1907 “played 
a fundamental role in the elimination of panics and hence it deeply affected the behavior of 
short-term interest rate.” (p. 562) For this reason, we extended the ADF regression to the 
last part of 1907. Table VI reports the results of ADF regressions for selected intervals.
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Table VI. ADF Regression Results of the 60DR Time Series for Selected 
Intervals of 1907 and 1908
Intervals Nr. of 
Obs
Nr. of 
Outliers
C l T-statistic Statistical
Significance
Jan. 3, 1890-Dec. 31, 1910 1082 43 -0.03 -3.78* Reject H(0)
Jan. 7, 1911-Dec. 30, 1933 1200 18 -0.01 -2.63 Can’t rej. H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Nov. 24, 1899 503 28 -0.05 -3.27* Reject H(0)
Dec.l, 1889-Oct. 25, 1907 413 31 -0.05 -3.16* Reject H(0)
Nov. 1, 1907-May 31, 1919 605 12 -0.04 -3.5* Reject H(0)
June 7, 1919-Oct. 5, 1929 540 9 -0.01 -1.24 Can’t rej. H(0)
Oct. 12, 1929-Dec.30, 1933 221 4 -0.03 -3.01* Reject H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Oct. 25, 1907 916 36 -0.02 -3.51* Reject H(0)
Nov. 1, 1907-Dec.30, 1933 1366 25 -0.01 -3.13* Reject H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-March 6, 1908 935 39 -0.03 -3.62* Reject H(0)
Mar. 13, 1908-Dec.30, 1933 1347 22 -0.01 -2.90* Reject H(0)
Jan. 3, 1890-Oct. 16, 1908 967 39 -0.03 -3.77* Reject H(0)
Nov. 6, 1908-Dec.30, 1933 1313 22 -0.01 -2.92* Reject H(0)
Dec. 4, 1908-Dec. 30, 1933 1309 22 -0.01 -2.79 Can’t rej. H(0)
Jan. 9, 1909-Dec. 30, 1933 1304 22 -0.01 -2.84 Can’t rej. H(0)
Feb. 13, 1909-Dec. 30, 1933 1299 22 -0.01 -2.81 Can’t rej. H(0)
Mar. 13, 1909-Dec.30, 1933 1295 22 -0.01 -2.81 Can’t rej. H(0)
Notes: (1) The actual regressions included also a trend component and 9 past differences,
as indicated by eq. (2). Since in none of regressions was the trend statistically
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significant we ignored it. In most cases all estimated coefficients for outliers 
(dummy variables) are statistically significant (at 5 % level).
(2) At 5% level of significance the critical t value for ADF statistic is -2.86 (for a 
very large sample).
(3) Source: Table 8.5.2 of Fuller (1976, p. 373).
(4) H(0) is the existence of a unit root. Consequently, if we cannot reject the H(0) 
we assume that the series was non-stationary on that interval.
As we can see, the earliest interval when the series began to be non-stationary was 
December 1908 - December 1933. Because the March 1908- December 1933 period had 
an estimated t-value (-2.9) very close to critical value of -2.86 we conclude that the 60DR 
time series changed behavior from stationary to non-stationary between March 1908 and 
December 1908.
Results of ADF test indicate that when one includes or excludes outliers, the 
interest rate is stationary (i.e. reject the null hypothesis of unit root). Thus, during the 
period prior to March 1908, ADF tests are invariant to the inclusion of outliers. Contrary 
to this, results for the period after December 1908 indicate that the ADF test rejects the 
null o f unit root when outliers are not accounted for. However, the ADF test finds the 
interest rate to be non-stationary when one accounts for outliers. When one does not take 
into account large changes in the series as outliers, the existence of weeks with large 
changes may bias the ADF test towards finding the series to be stationary. The reason for 
this is that these large changes may add a volatile component to the underlying data 
generating process o f a unit root. If  this volatility is large enough it can mask the random
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(Shaded area represents the interval on which the series 
was non-stationary: December 1908-December 1933)
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walk nature o f the series and make the process appear stationary when subjected to 
standard unit root tests.
It is worth mentioning that when the ADF test was performed without either the 
inclusion o f dummy variables accounting for outliers or trend component the results 
suggest a different break point of the 60DR time series. The most likely period when the 
stochastic process generating the 60DR time series changed from generating a stationary 
series to a non-stationary one would be between June 1911 and November 1911. We can 
observe that the statistical sensitivity of the series to the inclusion or exclusion of the 
outliers is relatively high.
Another way for deciding whether the 60DR time series changed its statistical 
behavior sometime during 1908 consists in the following rule (Holden and Perman, 1994, 
p. 53): for the period in which the series was stationary the estimated autocorrelations 
should fade away rapidly as the number of lags increases whereas for the period when the 
series was non-stationary the autocorrelations should decay slowly. Table VII presents a 
sample of estimated autocorrelation coefficients of the 60DR time series for the period 
between 1890 and March 1908 and for the period between December 1908 and 1933.
Table VII. Sample Autocorrelation Coefficients for the 60DR Time Series.
(January 3, 1890-March 13, 1908 and December 4, 1908-December 30, 1933)
Number of Sample Autocorrelation Coefficients
Lags January 3, 1890-March 13, 1908-December 4, 1908-December 30, 1933
1 0.969 (0.707) 0.982 (0.857)
2 0.927 (0.666) 0.960 (0.822)
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3 0.883 (0.639) 0.937(0.811)
4 0.841 (0.646) 0.912 (0.792)
5 0.801 (0.609) 0.89 (0.785)
6 0.765 (0.598) 0.87 (0.744)
7 0.731 (0.535) 0.851 (0.731)
S 0.7 (0.562) 0.833 (0.731)
9 0.67 (0.539) 0.816(0.716)
10 0.643 (0.504) 0.8 (0.707)
12 0.602 (0.494) 0.762 (0.667)
24 0.383 (0.368) 0.552 (0.495)
36 0.352(0.353) 0.395 (0.354)
48 0.458 (0.404) 0.294 (0.263)
60 0.378 (0.343) 0.138 (0.119)
Notes: a) The estimated values of the autocorrelation coefficients are all statistically
significant at 1 % level of significance. (Q-Statistic)
b) In parentheses are the autocorrelation coefficients that account for dummy 
variables (outliers).
We can observe that in the period after December 1908 the estimated 
autocorrelation coefficients fade away quicker as the number of lags increases compared 
to the period before March 1908. Graph 3 and 4 show that for a longer than 36-period lag 
the autocorrelation coefficients for the second period faded away faster than for the first 
period. The long fade away period and the cyclical period of the autocorrelation
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coefficients for the first period suggests that, between 1890 and 1908, the 60DR time 
series had a long memory. Although this fact does not indicate that the series was not 
stationary over the 1890-1908 interval, it does indicate that the series was extremely 
sensitive to shocks.
If  a time series with unit root (or non-stationary) were shocked, the shocks would 
persist forever. If a time series, instead, follow a stationary process this suggests that a 
shock would persist a certain (finite) time only. The duration of the shock persistence 
would vary from case to case but the series would eventually absorb the shock. (The 
values of the series would revert to a long-run mean.) Graph 3 suggests a very long 
absorption time of shocks by the 60DR time series. The persistent nature of time series 
and its implications on the AR(1) models have been studied using the Fractionally 
Integrated Autoregressive Moving Average models. (Choi and Wohar, 1994) According 
to the Fractionally Integrated models the unit-root hypothesis is a special and restrictive 
case of a time series. Long-memory processes are stationary.
The 60DR time series was generated from a stationary process between 1890 and 
the beginning of 1908, but its autocorrelation function decays much more slowly than that 
from “classical” stationary processes. This finding, as we have seen earlier, is consistent 
with “a stationary process with a long memory.” (Choi and Wohar, 1994, p. 919) A long 
memory process has the ability to display significant dependence between observations 
widely separated in time.
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5.5 The 1907 American Crisis and the Bank of England
Prior to the First World War, Britain was the leading global economic force. It is 
hard for one to believe that the US economic crises could have had a big impact on the 
London decision makers. Nevertheless, economic connections between Britain and the US 
were strong enough to determine a crisis or a boom to be easily transmitted from either 
Britain to the US or vice versa. Moreover, the monetary systems of both Britain and the 
US were based on the gold standard, whereas the monetary (institutional) structure of 
Britain was different from the monetary structure of the US.
The British and American convergence of monetary goals (Britain and the US 
wanted to maintain the gold standard) and divergence of monetary means (due to the fact 
that Britain had a central bank, but the US did not) had more implications. First, since 
there were strong ties between the British and American economies, a situation of crisis in 
the US would tend to spread to Britain. Paradoxically, because of institutional differences 
between Britain and the US, a situation of crisis in Britain would tend to spread over to 
the US slower than a US crisis spread to Britain.
Secondly, due to the monetary institutional differences between Britain and the 
US, when a crisis began in the US, Britain reacted promptly to protect the gold standard. 
As we have seen earlier, in such situations, the method used most by the Bank of England 
was the increase of the bank rate. Contrary to the US, where in cases of financial crises 
interest rates would increase suddenly, in Britain the increase of the bank rate was gradual. 
The Bank not only decided weekly whether or not to change its bank rate, but it also 
“became much more tender in its attitude towards trade and industry.” (Morgan, 1965, p.
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216) Consequently, after the 1907 American crisis, the Bank of England acted as if it 
intended to smooth interest rates.
Thirdly, after 1907, the Bank of England diversified its monetary policy tools. The 
most non-conformist one was the direct operations in the gold market. The Bank, would 
raise the buying price of bullion, raise the selling price of gold bars, manipulate the buying 
and selling price of foreign coin, and it even made interest-free advances to gold 
importers. Occasionally, in order to protect the gold reserves, the Bank imposed on the 
market a higher interest rate without increasing its bank rate. (Administratively, 
sometimes, the Bank charged a higher rate for advances than for discounts, or it 
discriminated against certain types of bills.) The new monetary tools used by the Bank 
were designed at both protecting the domestic economy and the gold standard. More 
specifically, the Bank did not want to harm the economy by increasing the bank rate.
Clark (1935) recognized the determinant role of London for the financing trade of 
the US at the beginning of the 19th century. ”In the matter o f foreign exchange and 
foreign trade financing the US were for the most part dependent upon the London money 
market. The US foreign trade was largely financed abroad. There was no power for the 
New York money market to exert a decisive influence on gold movements by means of 
money rate changes or the settling of international balances by offering bankers’ 
acceptances. “ (Clark, 1935, p. 15-16)
On October 22, 1907 the Knickerbocker Trust went bankrupt and cash payments 
were suspended “practically throughout the American banking system.” (Morgan, 1965, 
p. 222) Immediately, because American banks needed cash, gold began to flow out of
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Britain to the US and the Bank of England increased its (bank) rate from 5.5 % in October 
to 7 % in November 1907. The Aldrich-Vreeland act of June 1908 was highly praised by 
the British media and the most influential economic magazine of the time believed that “it 
would undoubtedly be a means of providing relief in the event of acute monetary 
stringency.” ( The Economist. June 13, 1908, p. 1245) Not only the media was favorable 
to the new American currency act, but also the Bank’s officials believed that the act 
“would help British commercial banks, in case a similar panic occurred in New York.” 
(Ibid., p. 1138)
The Bank of England never declared (publicly) that starting with a certain period it 
would change its main monetary policy goal from protecting the gold reserves to 
smoothing interest rates. This fact would suggest that after 1908, when the monetary 
environment changed not only in the US, but also in Britain, the Bank of England 
gradually came to alter the target of its monetary policy.
We have seen that the 60DR time series became non-stationary after December 
1908. Researchers also agree on the theory that the non-stationarity of the interest rate 
would be consistent with interest rate smoothing employed by central banks. At the same 
time, our finding is compatible with the rational expectations theory according to which 
only unannounced (or unpredicted) events can change (persistently) economic behavior.
Conclusion
Previous works suggested that the founding of the Fed or the breakdown of the 
gold standard in 1914 would have been the main responsible cause for the changed
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behavior of short-term interest rate time series for both the US and Britain. Using ADF 
tests, our results imply that the British 60-day bankers’ draft rate time series changed its 
statistical behavior sometime between March 1908 and December 1908. Between 1890 
and March 1908 the series was stationary (with possible long memory). Between 
December 1908 and December 1933 the series was non-stationary (we could not reject the 
hypothesis of a unit root). Historically, the March 1908-December 1908 period coincides 
with the end of the American financial panic of 1907 and with the adoption of the Aldrich- 
Vreeland act in June 1908. Although it is not very clear how the American crisis affected 
so much the monetary goals pursued by the Bank of England, it seems the only plausible 
cause.
At the beginning of the financial panic of 1906-7 American banks were facing a 
very severe liquidity crisis. Since the American banks badly needed cash, they were willing 
to borrow from British commercial banks at much higher rates than the British banks 
could lend to domestic customers. The British commercial banks, in turn, would buy gold 
from the Bank of England and would ship it over to the American banks. To protect its 
gold reserves, the Bank of England increased the bank rate. The Bank believed that 
commercial banks would be deterred from borrowing money from the Bank and buying 
gold with it (at the official rate). Despite the high level of the bank rate, the gold continued 
to be massively exported to the US during the 1906-7 crisis.
The American crisis peaked in October 1907. By March 1908 the financial crisis 
was over. To prevent a future crisis, in June 1908 the US Congress passed the Aldrich-
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Vreeland act. The act granted special emergencies powers to New York City banks and 
created the National Monetary Commission. (Miron, 1986, p. 131)
The timing of the 1907 American crisis and the passage of the Aldrich-Vreeland 
act coincides entirely with the period when the behavior of British short-term interest rate 
time series changed. We believe that the massive export of gold from Britain to the US 
during the 1907 crisis determined the Bank of England to follow more closely the seasonal 
movements in domestic money demand. At the same time, the Aldrich-Vreeland act 
increased the financial stability of the American banking system. As a consequence, 
American commercial banks ceased to borrow “emergency money” from British banks. 
After 1908 the Bank of England did not have to worry so much about protecting its gold 
reserves since the American banks were required to meet the unexpected withdrawal 
demands with their own permanent reserves.
According to Clark (1986) the Fed begun interest rate smoothing in the last part of 
1917, while the (American) short-term interest rate time series became non-stationary in 
the last part of 1914. Angelini (1994) argues that the US short-term interest rate time 
series became non-stationary in 1908, after the enforcement of the Aldrich-Vreeland act.
In consequence, it seems that the Fed activity (per se) did not influence the behavior of 
short-term interest rate time series. In addition, Fukuda (1995) shows that the founding of 
the Bank of Japan did not alter the behavior of interest rate time series in Japan. Contrary 
to the models of interest rate smoothing, the changes in the behavior of interest rates were 
gradual.
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We have seen that the founding of the Fed had no effect on the behavior of British 
short-term rates. We also determined that the American financial panic of 1907 seems to 
have changed the banking environment both in the US and Britain. After 1908, the 
increased stability of the American banking system eliminated much of the London money 
market pressure. For this reason, the Bank of England could better distinguish between 
domestic and foreign monetary crises. Consequently, the Bank of England begun to follow 
more closely the seasonal movements of domestic interest rates. Although the Bank of 
England never declared openly that it would supply “elastic currency” to the economy, 
the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that after March 1908 the Bank started to 
smooth interest rates.
6.1 Future Research
In order to better understand the connection between central banking and interest 
rate behavior, future research need to extend the analysis of when the behavior of short­
term interest rates changed for both more interest rate time series and for different 
countries.
Prior to the First World War, the economic relations between the US and Britain 
were, in many respects, peculiar. First, Britain had prime interests in the US economy. 
Secondly, there existed some major structural differences between the US and British 
economies. Due to structural differences, Britain was more vulnerable to American 
economic crises than the vice-versa. For these reasons, the study of interest rate behavior
83
needs to be extended to more European countries, where central banks had been in place 
before the American crisis o f 1907.
The works of Fukuda (1995) and Angelini (1994) revealed that, in the Japanese 
and (restricted) American case, the behavior of short-term interest rates changed 
independently o f the time when the central banks were founded. In the Britain case we 
have shown that the 60-day bankers’ drafts time series changed its statistical behavior in 
1908, long before the Fed was founded in the US. Yet, we could not demonstrate that the 
British interest rate behavior was the result of (only) domestic monetary policy. For this 
reason, more studies need to be done on the French, German, and Italian short-term 
interest rates behavior, countries in which, decades before 1908, there had existed central 
banks.
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